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ABSTRACT 
In 1783, an English court wrote: “[A] confession forced from 
the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in 
so questionable a shape . . . that no credit ought to be given to it.” 
Yet today over 97% of all convictions in the United States result 
from plea bargaining.  In 2017, South Korea renewed a decades-
old debate over whether to formally recognize plea bargaining, 
and, in 2018, Japan’s new formal plea bargaining system took 
effect. The working assumption in each case is that, absent a 
threat of violence or mental coercion, innocent people do not 
plead guilty and plea bargaining efficiently renders justice. With 
the assistance of the Japan Foundation Center for Global 
Partnership and colleagues in Japan and South Korea, we 
conducted laboratory experiments to test those assumptions. Do 
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the innocent plead guilty? Do the accused falsely implicate the 
innocent? If so, are additional safeguards necessary to minimize 
that risk? The data suggests that basic human tendencies, across 
cultures, run counter to the assumptions underlying plea 
bargaining. The data suggest that the innocent plead guilty, and 
that it happens at rates that should lead to a re-evaluation of the 
risks and benefits of plea bargaining, as practiced in the United 
States, in Japan, and under consideration in South Korea.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1783, an English court wrote: “[A] confession forced from 
the mind by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in 
so questionable a shape . . . that no credit ought to be given to it.”1 
About a hundred years later, the US Supreme Court said much the 
same: The “true test of admissibility is that the confession is made 
freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any 
sort.”2 
Yet today over 97% of all convictions in the United States 
result from plea bargaining. 3  Its dominance stems from a 
“compromise.” In 1970, the United States Supreme Court 
prohibited pleas induced by threats of physical harm or mental 
coercion overbearing the will of the defendant, but authorized plea 
bargaining stopping short of that in order to increase efficiency 
and reduce the burden on an overburdened criminal legal system.4 
While the Supreme Court in 1970 envisioned plea bargaining as a 
means of increasing resources for the traditional trial, by 2012, the 
Court recognized that bargained justice had triumphed. “Criminal 
justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of 
trials.”5 
In Supreme Court jurisprudence, the working assumption 
underlying the compromise of 1970 is that, absent a threat of 
violence or mental coercion, a significant number of innocent 
people will not plead guilty.6 Over the years, anecdotal evidence 
has challenged these assumptions. The Innocence Project has 
 
 
1. Rex v. Warickshall, 168 Eng. Rep. 234 (1783).  
2. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896). 
3. See Guilty Pleas and Trials by Types of Crime: Fiscal Year 2019, U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-
reports-and-sourcebooks/2019/Table12.pdf [https://perma.cc/PJ86-4AZC] (last visited 
Nov. 21, 2020). 
4. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752-58 (1970). 
5. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 133, 170 (2012) (“Criminal justice today is for the most 
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions 
and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”). 
6. Lucian E. Dervan & Vanessa A. Edkins, Ph.D., The Innocent Defendant’s Dilemma: An 
Innovative Empirical Study of Plea Bargaining’s Innocence Problem, 103 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1, 18-19 (2013). 
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documented some of these cases. 7  Scholars have examined 
exoneration data, and one 2005 study found twenty of 340 
exonerees, six percent, had pled guilty. 8  More recently, the 
National Registry of Exonerations found the numbers of false pleas 
growing. For example, a 2015 study noted that in 2014 and 2015, 
ninety percent of known drug-case exonerations were based on 
false guilty pleas. 9  There are, however, obvious limitations to 
anecdotal evidence. And the exoneree studies are limited to a small 
subset of claims, many involving serious felonies for which there is 
available DNA evidence and the capacity to pursue exoneration.10 
To fill this lacuna, there are now psychological plea bargaining 
studies conducted in laboratory settings that examine the 
likelihood that an innocent person will be “driven to false self-
condemnation.”11  A study by two of the Authors of this Article, 
published in 2013, demonstrated that more than fifty percent of 
“innocent” participants were willing to plead guilty to something 
they did not do.12 The results of this initial study brought to an end 
the longstanding debate regarding whether and to what extent 
innocents will falsely plead guilty. As the Innocence Project wrote 
in a US Supreme Court amicus curiae brief that discussed this 
research, “[i]nnocent defendants, like guilty defendants, plead 
guilty in exchange for lighter sentences because the benefits of 
doing so outweigh the costs of facing trial.”13 
 
7. See All Cases, INNOCENCE PROJECT, https://www.innocenceproject.org/all-cases/ 
[https://perma.cc/5QXR-37KL] (last visited Aug. 15, 2018). 
8. See Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States 1989 Through 2003, 95 
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 524, 536 (2005). See also George C. Thomas III, Two Windows 
into Innocence, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 575, 577-78 (2010) (“McConville and Baldwin 
concluded that two percent of the guilty pleas were of doubtful validity. As there were 
roughly two million felony cases filed in 2006, if two percent result in conviction of an 
innocent defendant, 40,000 wrongful felony convictions occur per year.”). 
9. Innocents Who Plead Guilty, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS 2 (Nov. 24, 2015), 
http://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/NRE.Guilty.Plea.Article1.p
df [https://perma.cc/D6HX-9TZZ]. 
10. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 6, at 21. 
11. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 6, at 48 (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 
363 (1978)). 
12. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 6, at 28-33. 
13. Brief of the Innocence Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9, Class 
v. United States, 138 S.Ct. 798 (2018); see generally Thea Johnson, Fictional Pleas, 94 
INDIANA L.J. 855 (2019). 
2020] BARGAINED JUSTICE 463 
The issue of false pleas by the innocent is not a phenomenon 
unique to the United States. Plea bargaining has spread around the 
world and become a predominant means of resolving criminal 
charges.14 A 2017 report by Fair Trials documented not only the 
increasing use of plea bargaining globally, but also the manner in 
which bargains now dominate individual criminal legal systems 
once flush with trials. The report notes: 
In many parts of the world, trials are being replaced by legal 
regimes that encourage suspects to admit guilt and waive their 
right to a full trial. Of the 90 countries studied by Fair Trials 
and Freshfields, 66 now have these kinds of formal “trial 
waiver” systems in place. In 1990, the number was just 19. 
Once introduced, trial waivers can quickly dominate. In 
Georgia, for example, 12.7% of cases were resolved through its 
plea bargaining system in 2005, increasing massively to 87.8% 
of cases by 2012.15 
This global rise in plea bargaining led us to expand our research to 
other countries, with a specific focus on a comparative analysis of 
plea bargaining and innocence in the United States, Japan, and 
South Korea. 
Our findings were, on the one hand, expected. False pleas and 
the innocent defendant’s dilemma are global phenomena. In this 
comparative research, however, we also collected new data that 
may surprise and should call into question the validity and the 
accuracy of the testimony by those accepting bargains.  
Our data indicate that a significant number of individuals are 
not only willing to falsely plead guilty in return for a benefit, they 
are also willing to falsely testify against others in official 
proceedings to secure those advantages for themselves. This is the 
first time laboratory research has demonstrated the false plea 
phenomenon in different countries, cultures, and legal systems.  It 
is also the first time laboratory research has documented the 
 
14. See, e.g., A Deal You Can’t Refuse: The Troubling Spread of Plea Bargaining from 
America to the World, ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2017), 
https://www.economist.com/news/international/21731159-tool-making-justice-
swifter-too-often-snares-innocent-troubling-spread [https://permaa.cc/T3DM-DTH7].  
15. The Disappearing Trial Report: A Global Study into the Spread and Growth in Trial 
Waiver System, FAIR TRIALS (Apr. 27, 2017), 
https://www.fairtrials.org/publication/disappearing-trial-report#countries-with-trial-
waiver-systems [https://perma.cc/HZ28-8XRT]. 
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phenomenon of false testimony in return for the benefits of a plea 
bargain. 
For our comparative analysis, we selected three countries at 
different stages of their recognition of plea bargaining: Japan, 
South Korea, and the United States. In Japan, in May of 2016, the 
Diet passed an omnibus bill amending its Code of Criminal 
Procedure.16 The bill provided for recording police interrogations 
for certain crimes, expanded wiretapping authority, expanded 
disclosure of evidence, and prosecutorial immunity.17 For the first 
time, it also formally recognized plea bargaining in Japan.18 
The Prime Minister’s Cabinet dubbed the bill their “Strategy 
for Making Japan the Safest Country in the World.”19 The Ministry 
of Justice described the bill as creating a new criminal justice 
system fitting for the times—one that moves away from reliance 
on confession and employs a variety of evidence gathering 
techniques and a robust public trial process. 20  Commentators 
suggest the measures were an attempt “to revamp the nation’s 
notoriously opaque judicial process.”21 
 
16. See Keiji Soshou Hou nado ga Kaisei Saremashita, NICHIBENREN 1 (June 2016), 
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/library/ja/publication/booklet/data/keijisoshohoto_kai
sei_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2MSJ-PQVQ]. 
17. Tomohiro Osaki, Diet passes legislation to revamp Japan’s criminal justice system, 
JAPAN TIMES (May 24, 2016), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/05/24/national/diet-passes-legislation-
revamp-japans-secretive-judicial-system/ [https://perma.cc/24EK-B9N4] (noting that 
recording will be limited to “grave” crimes including murder, arson, and kidnapping; 
crimes tried under the lay judge system, and cases specially investigated by prosecutors). 
Mark A. Levin, Considering Japanese Criminal Justice from an Original Position, in CRIME AND 
JUSTICE IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN 175, 183 (Jianhong Liu & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2017) 
(scholars suggest the new rule will apply to only three percent of all cases). 
18. Akira Gotou, 2015 Nen Keisou Kaisei Houan ni Okeru Kyougi/Goui Seidou, 8 SOUGOU 
HOURITSU SHIEN RONSHUU 2-3 (2015), http://www.houterasu.or.jp/cont/100779662.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W899-R4CN]. 
19. M. Hayashi, Keiji Soshou Hou Kaisei, Nihonban ‘Shihou Torihiki’ to ha (July 15, 
2016), https://www.corporate-
legal.jp/%E6%B3%95%E5%8B%99%E3%83%8B%E3%83%A5%E3%83%BC%E3%82
%B9/%E6%B3%95%E5%8B%99%E3%82%B3%E3%83%A9%E3%83%A0/6767 
[https://perma.cc/X7GS-2A6U]. See John O. Haley, Public Prosecution in Japan, OXFORD 
HANDBOOKS ONLINE (Dec. 2015) (no industrial democracy has a lower crime rate now). 
20 . MOJ, Keiji Soshou Hou nado no Ichibu o Kaisei Suru Houritsuan no Gaiyou, 
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001149703.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5F9-G982] (last 
visited Dec. 19, 2020). 
21. Osaki, supra note 17. 
2020] BARGAINED JUSTICE 465 
Much of the debate surrounding the bill centered on recording 
interrogations of the accused. 22  Critics have long argued that 
recording interrogations is necessary to stem the tide of false 
confessions that have arisen because of the grueling interrogations 
that Japanese police and prosecutors have traditionally pursued.23 
Recent events brought these concerns about Japan’s “hostage 
justice” to an international stage with the arrest and 139-day 
detention of Carlos Ghosn, former CEO and chair of the board of 
Nissan Corporation.24 
In the course of this debate over recording interrogations, 
prosecutors expressed concern that doing so would adversely 
affect information gathering, i.e. suspects would be less 
forthcoming with prosecutors.25 In exchange for acquiescence to 
recording certain criminal interrogations, prosecutors sought 
formal recognition of means to encourage cooperation, i.e. 
prosecutorial immunity and plea bargaining. 26  The Ministry of 
Justice’s Legislative Counsel, tasked in 2014 with drafting 
amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure, did just that.27 The 
omnibus reform bill codified, for the first time, a plea bargaining 
system.28 
Japan’s formal plea bargaining system took effect in June 
2018,29 and prosecutors entered their first formal plea bargain in 
July, with a Mitsubishi Hitachi Power Systems employee accused of 
 
22. See Yoshiaki Kai, Kiki Kanri Nyu-su: Sihou Torihiki Seido no Dounyuu to Kigyou 
Hanzai no Sousa ni Ataeru Eikyou, ANDERSON MORI & TOMOTSUNE, DISP. RESOL. GROUP NEWSL. 
1 (May 2016). 
23. Hayashi, supra note 19. 
24. See, e.g., Nicholas Johnson, Ghosn, Yamashiro, and the United Nations — Japan’s 
Coercive Police Practices in the International Spotlight, 17 ASIA-PACIFIC J. 1 (Oct. 1, 2019), 
https://apjjf.org/-Nicholas-Johnson/5317/article.pdf [https://perma.cc/GFV9-7VHR]; 
Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, Carlos Ghosn and Japan’s ‘hostage justice’ system, BBC NEWS (Dec. 
31, 2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47113189.2019 
[https://perma.cc/CD3D-X57R]. 
25. Gotou, supra note 18, at 4. 
26. Gotou, supra note 18, at 4. 
27. Osaki, supra note 17. 
28. Gotou, supra note 18, at 4; Nichibenren, Keiji Soshou nado no Ichibu wo 
Kaisei Suru Houritsuan Sangiin De Kakatsu, 500 NICHIBENREN SHINBUN (2015), 
https://www.nichibenren.or.jp/document/newspaper/year/2015/500.html 
[https://perma.cc/UKS6-JPPL]. 
29. Nichibenren, supra note 16, at 1. 
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bribery.30 In exchange for information regarding the employer’s 
violation of Japan’s antitrust law, the prosecutors agreed to forego 
indictment of the employee accused of bribery.31 In November of 
the same year, prosecutors negotiated plea bargains with two 
Nissan employees in exchange for information that led to the arrest 
of Carlos Ghosn.32 
Both plea bargains highlight an important difference between 
Japan’s formal plea bargaining system and the system used in the 
United States. As discussed in Part II, Japan’s plea bargaining 
system permits plea bargaining agreements only for certain types 
of crimes, and only in exchange for the accused providing 
information about a crime committed by a third party. 33  At the 
same time, there is evidence of widespread informal plea 
bargaining in Japan. Field research completed well before the 
amendments suggests ten to twenty percent of all cases are 
bargained, regardless of the crime, and regardless of whether the 
information relates to a third party.34  
The Japanese Federation of Bar Associations released a 
statement following the amendments to Japan’s Code of Criminal 
Procedure. It welcomed the introduction of videotaped 
interrogations, but warned that plea bargaining will result in false 
 
30. Thai bribery case leads to Japan’s first plea bargain, JAPAN TIMES (July 14, 2018), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/07/14/national/crime-legal/case-
concerning-bribery-thai-public-servant-japanese-prosecutors-reach-first-ever-plea-
bargain-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/N5HW-8S5R]. 
31. Id. (Tokyo prosecutors agreed to forego indictment of an employee of Mitsubishi 
Hitachi Power Systems, Ltd. accused of bribing a Thai civil servant, in exchange for 
cooperation in the prosecutor’s investigation of the employer). 
32. Two of Ghosn’s Former Aides avoid indictment through plea bargain deal with 
Tokyo prosecutors, JAPAN TIMES (May 10, 2019), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2019/05/10/business/corporate-business/two-
ghosns-former-aides-avoid-indictment-plea-bargain-deal-tokyo-prosecutors/ 
[https://perma.cc/L4X2-THZ6]; Magalena Osumi & Satoshi Sugiyama, Victim of plea 
bargaining? Carlos Ghosn’s arrest based on murky evidence, former prosecutor says, JAPAN 
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2018/11/26/national/crime-legal/victim-plea-
bargaining-carlos-ghosns-arrest-based-murky-evidence-former-prosecutor-says/ 
[https://perma.cc/P5PY-PJ5Z]. 
33. KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. Crim. Pro.] 2018, arts. 350-2, 350-3 (Japan); Nichibenren, 
supra note 16, at 1. 
34. David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining in Japan, in THE JAPANESE ADVERSARY SYSTEM IN 
CONTEXT 140, 154-56 (Malcolm M. Feeley & Setsuo Miyazawa eds., 2002). 
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information and increased risk of false accusations.35 As shown in 
Parts III and IV, those concerns are well-founded. 
In 2008, South Korea’s Supreme Prosecutor’s Office reached a 
consensus that South Korea needed a plea bargaining system.36 
They formed a study group,37 and the Ministry of Justice drafted 
legislation codifying a plea bargaining process.38 Newspapers and 
commentators reported the imminent adoption of plea bargaining 
in South Korea. 39  But the legislation failed to pass. 40  The bill, 
introduced in 2010, 41  was opposed by South Korea’s National 
Human Rights Commission, among others, and it failed to receive 
endorsement from members of the Prime Minister’s Cabinet.42 
The debate over the merits of plea bargaining, however, 
continued. In 2016, the Seoul Metropolitan Government 
announced plans to introduce an internal plea bargaining system 
in an effort to “promote whistle-blowing.” 43  They intended to 
encourage city employees under investigation for corruption to 
reveal irregularities committed by others in return for reduced 
 
35. Osaki, supra note 17. 
36. Prosecution Head Wants Plea Bargaining System, KBS WORLD (Nov. 1, 2008), 
http://rki.kbs.co.kr/news_print.htm?lang=e&No=58755&Category=News 
[https://perma.cc/5NEZ-U4PL]; Plea Bargaining System May be Introduced, KBS WORLD 
(Oct. 14, 2008), 
http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_Dm_detail.htm?lang=e&id=Dm&No=58276&
current_page=1162 [https://perma.cc/4PVZ-NVKU]. 
37. Prosecution Head Wants Plea Bargaining System, supra note 36.  
38 . Justice Ministry to Introduce Plea Bargaining, KBS WORLD (June 6, 2010), 
http://world.kbs.co.kr/english/news/news_Po_detail.htm?lang=e&id=Po&No=73110&c
urrent_page=7 [https://perma.cc/LX9C-PLNS]. 
39. Kim Rahn, Plea bargain to be adopted next year, KOREA TIMES (Dec. 21, 2010), 
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/11/113_78399.html 
[https://perma.cc/8UT5-VT8U]. See also Ryan Y. Park, The Globalizing Jury Trial: Lessons 
and Insights from Korea, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 525, 551 (2010). 
40 . Park Si-soo, Plea bargaining Plan put on Hold, KOREA TIMES (May 3, 2011), 
https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/08/113_86372.html 
[https://perma.cc/2AYD-HJKW]. 
41. Rahn, supra note 39.  
42. Si-soo, supra note 40.  
43. Seoul Seeks to Promote Whistle-blowing with System Similar to Plea Bargaining, 
KBS WORLD (Oct. 13, 2016), 
http://rki.kbs.co.kr/news_print.htm?lang=e&No=122472&Category=News 
[https://perma.cc/6EW9-H4ZG]. 
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punishment.44 South Korea has struggled with corruption,45 and 
the goal was to effectuate the anti-bribery legislation passed in 
2014. 46  City officials sought “corruption-free officialdom by 
strengthening the self-purification capacity through self-control, 
responsibility, communication and cooperation.”47 
In December of 2017, the Supreme Prosecutor’s Office began 
another push to amend the Criminal Procedure Act to formally 
recognize plea bargaining.48 News reports suggest that increased 
concern about conviction rates and difficulties in obtaining 
convictions in recent high-profile corruption cases prompted the 
effort.49 In 2018, those efforts confronted an “extraordinary public 
outcry” over informal plea bargaining following a murder in an 
internet café and concern about increasing rates of violent crime.50 
The debate over codification of plea bargaining in South Korea 
continues, but, even without it, there is widespread, and 
controversial, informal plea bargaining in South Korea.51 
 
44. Id. 
45.  David T. Johnson, The Prosecution of Corruption in South Korea, in LEGAL REFORM 
IN KOREA 47 (Tom Ginsberg ed. 2004) (stating that “South Korea is corrupt,” and elsewhere 
describing “endemic corruption scandals in Korea”). Tom Ginsberg, The politics of legal 
reform in Korea, in LEGAL REFORM IN KOREA (Tom Ginsberg ed. 2004). Both are statements 
that remain true today, though less so. In 2001, Transparency International ranked South 
Korea 42nd out of 91 countries in its 2001 Corruption Perceptions Index. Id. at 47. In 2017, 
South Korea ranked 54th out of 183. By comparison, the United States ranked 21st and 
Japan 23rd. See Transparency Int’l, Corruption Perceptions Index 2017: Global Scores, 
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017#tabl
e [https://perma.cc/Q3QD-SZU7] (last visited Dec. 19, 2020).  
46. Seoul Seeks to Promote Whistle-blowing with System Similar to Plea Bargaining, 
KBS WORLD (Oct. 13, 2016), 
http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=122472 (referencing 
the Park Won-Soon Act). 
47 . See Seoul Seeks to Promote Whistle-blowing with System Similar to Plea 
Bargaining, KBS WORLD (Oct. 13, 2016), 
http://world.kbs.co.kr/service/news_view.htm?lang=e&Seq_Code=122472 
[https://perma.cc/N4TD-7HGD]. 
48. Lee Kyung-min, Prosecutors float Idea of adopting plea bargaining, KOREA TIMES 
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2020/06/356_240577.html 
[https://perma.cc/P33G-HPKA]. 
49. Id. 
50 . Kim Yoo-sin & Lee Ha-yeon, Korean police reveal suspect’s identity in brutal 
murder case, PULSE (Oct. 22, 2018), 
https://m.pulsenews.co.kr/view.php?year=2018&no=657849 [https://perma.cc/8TTR-
WDPN]. 
51. Re-Seop Park, The Current Debate about Plea Bargaining in Korea, 4 (2017) (on 
file with authors) [hereinafter Park Paper]; Roh Myeong Seon, Sae-lo-un jin-sul-jeung-geo 
hwag-bo-bang-an-e gwan-han gae-jeong (Amendment on Expansion of Evidence), at 15. 
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South Korea and Japan have stepped down a path well-worn 
in the United States. Their prosecutors engage in de facto plea 
bargaining, and they seek or sought formal authority to do so. This 
debate over codification of plea bargaining and the widespread use 
of informal plea bargaining raise new questions about the 
fundamental fairness of plea bargaining in South Korea and Japan, 
just as in the United States. 
With formal or informal plea bargaining, do the innocent 
plead guilty? Do the accused falsely implicate the innocent to 
secure their own bargains? Do the accused behave similarly in 
South Korea, Japan, and the United States when analyzing the risks 
and benefits of a guilty plea? If so, what additional safeguards are 
necessary to minimize that risk? These questions, important in 
their own right, also offer a point of comparison. What do the 
answers tell us about the role and rule of law in these different 
countries, cultures, and legal systems? With the assistance of the 
Japan Foundation Center for Global Partnership, as well as 
colleagues in each location, we engaged in psychological studies in 
Japan, South Korea and the United States to explore these 
questions. 
Part II of this paper offers a comparative analysis of the 
historical and legal framework for plea bargaining in the United 
States, Japan, and South Korea. Part III discusses the new 
laboratory studies conducted in each country to analyze false plea 
rates and test the effectiveness of procedural safeguards to reduce 
the chance of false pleas. Part III also discusses our findings 
regarding the rates of false testimony for false pleas. The Article 
concludes with observations about the data obtained in each study. 
In short, basic human tendencies documented in each country 
run counter to the basic assumptions underlying plea bargaining 
and innocence. South Korea, Japan, and the United States each have 
an innocence problem. This research suggests that the risk of the 
innocent pleading guilty and falsely implicating others is real and 
that it is a global phenomenon—one that transcends borders and 
legal systems. As jurisdictions across the globe increasing rely on 
bargained justice, the question becomes what do we do next? 
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II. HISTORICAL & LEGAL FRAMEWORK—A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
A. United States 
Plea bargaining hasn’t always dominated the criminal legal 
system in the United States.52 Plea bargaining issues rose to the 
fore after the American Civil War, and, in each case, the appellate 
courts summarily rejected these bargains.53 The US Supreme Court 
did the same in 1896 in Wilson v. United States stating, without 
equivocation, that the “true test of admissibility is that the 
confession is made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or 
inducement of any sort.”54 
1. Informal plea bargaining 
That is not to say that plea bargaining didn’t happen. It did, in 
the shadows, and often as a tool of corruption.55 In the early 1900s, 
defense attorneys in New York City would “stand . . . in front of the 
Night Court and dicker away sentences . . . $300 for ten days, $200 
for twenty days, $150 for thirty days.” 56  In Chicago, “fixers” 
negotiated bargains between the government and the defense. 
Those “leaches” facilitating the plea bargain were a “serious 
indictment against our system of criminal administration.”57 
During that same period, however, over-criminalization 
forced plea bargaining out of the shadows. “As the number of 
criminal statutes—and, as a result, criminal defendants—swelled, 
court systems became overwhelmed.”58 And prosecutors turned to 
plea bargaining. 59  The start of Prohibition in 1919 only 
 
52. Mark H. Haller, Plea Bargaining: The Nineteenth Century Context, 13 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 273, 273 (1979) (“[Alschuler and Friedman] agree that plea bargaining was probably 
nonexistent before 1800, began to appear during the early or mid-nineteenth century, and 
became institutionalized as a standard feature of American urban criminal courts in the 
last third of the nineteenth century.”). 
53. Albert W. Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 19-24 
(1979). 
54. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896). 
55. Alschuler, supra note 53, at 24. 
56. Id. 
57. Id. at 25. 
58. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 6, at 9. 
59. Id. 
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exacerbated the problem. By 1925, approximately ninety percent 
of criminal convictions resulted from guilty pleas. 60  Yet, the 
Supreme Court remained skeptical. In 1936, they found a guilty 
plea unconstitutional because of the inducements made to obtain 
it.61 
2. Formal plea bargaining 
Nonetheless, plea bargaining continued. And by 1967, even 
the American Bar Association (the “ABA”) acknowledged its 
benefits. 62  They noted that plea bargaining allows for the 
resolution of cases without a trial, which conserves necessary 
resources. It also serves the interest of the defendants. “[T]he 
limited use of the trial process for those cases in which the 
defendant has grounds for contesting the matter of guilt aids in 
preserving the meaningfulness of the presumption of innocence.”63 
Three years later, the Supreme Court agreed. In Brady v. 
United States, “the Court acknowledged the necessity of [plea 
bargaining] to protect crowded courts from collapse.”64 The court 
decided that certain types of plea bargains would be acceptable: 
[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct 
consequences, including the actual value of any commitments 
made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must 
stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue 
improper harassment), misrepresentation (including 
unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises 
that are by their nature improper as having no proper 
relationship to the prosecutor’s business (e.g. bribes).65 
As long as the plea was “voluntarily and intelligently made by 
competent defendants with adequate advice of counsel,” and not 
induced by “actual or threatened physical harm or by mental 
 
60. Id. at 10. 
61. Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941). 
62. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 6, at 11. 
63. See A.B.A., PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO 
PLEAS OF GUILTY 2 (1968). 
64. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752-58 (1970); Dervan & Edkins, supra note 
6, at 12. 
65. Id. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101, 115 (5th Cir. 1957) 
(Tuttle, J., dissenting)). 
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coercion overbearing the will of the defendant,” the plea bargain 
would stand.66 
Brady brought plea bargaining out of the shadows,67 and, for 
much of the past decade, approximately ninety-seven percent of all 
criminal cases have been resolved by guilty pleas.68 The Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure now recognize that a prosecutor, in 
return for a guilty plea, can agree to: 
 not bring additional charges, or move to dismiss charges 
already filed; 
 recommend, or agree not to oppose, the defendant’s 
request that a particular sentence or sentencing range is 
appropriate, or that a particular provision of the 
sentencing guidelines does or does not apply; 
 agree that a particular sentence or sentencing range is 
appropriate, or that a particular sentencing guideline 
does or does not apply. 69 
These agreements have been categorized as: (1) open pleas; (2) 
charge bargains; (3) sentence bargains; (4) binding pleas.70 
“An open plea is an agreement which leaves the sentence 
entirely to the Judge’s discretion, without any limitations or the 
dismissal of any charges.”71 With a charge bargain, a prosecutor 
and defendant engage in negotiations in which the defendant 
offers to plead guilty to a particular charge in exchange for the 
prosecutor dismissing or not filing a particular charge. 72  In 
contrast, sentence bargains describe agreements where the 
defendant agrees to plead guilty to a particular charge in exchange 
 
66. Id. at 750, 758; Dervan & Edkins, supra note 6, at 13. 
67. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 6, at 14. 
68 . See Sourcebook Archives, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 
https://www.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook/archive (last visited Dec. 16, 2020).  
69. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. These three types of plea bargains are often referred to in the 
cases and the literature as “Type A,” “Type B,” and “Type C” agreements. 1A CHARLES ALAN 
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE SUPPLEMENTAL SERVICE § 181 
(5th ed. 2020). 
70. Lucian E. Dervan, Arriving at a System of Pleas: The History and State of Plea 
Bargaining, in A SYSTEM OF PLEAS 12-13 (Vanessa A. Edkins & Allison D. Redlich eds., 2018).  
71. Williams v. State, 51 N.E.3d 1205, 1209 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). 
72. 16A WILLIAM ANDREW KERR, INDIANA PRACTICE SERIES, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.3 
(2020) (charge bargains may also include a defendant’s agreement to “plead guilty to an 
offense included within a charged offense in exchange for the prosecutor’s agreement not 
to pursue the greater offense.”). 
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for a promise by the prosecutor regarding the sentence to be 
imposed. The prosecutor may promise to recommend that the trial 
court impose a specific sentence (a “specific sentence bargain”) or 
the prosecutor may offer to remain silent and make no 
recommendation regarding the sentence, leaving it to the 
discretion of the court (a “non-specific sentence bargain”).73 
Finally, the plea may be binding or non-binding. With a non-
binding plea, the court retains the discretion to accept or reject the 
recommendations of the parties contained in the plea agreement.74 
While judges in the non-binding plea context often embrace the 
recommendations to encourage the practice of plea bargaining, 
they are not required to do so. 75  In contrast, binding plea 
agreements include a “specific sentence or sentencing range” and, 
if the plea is accepted by the court, the court must impose the 
agreed upon terms.76  Binding pleas are less common and often 
disfavored by judges who believe such agreements infringe on the 
court’s sentencing authority.77 
A prosecutor’s influence over sentencing recommendations 
and charge selections empowers them to create sentencing 
differentials, i.e. “the difference between the sentence a defendant 
faces when pleading guilty versus the sentence risked if he or she 
proceeds to trial and is convicted.”78 Observers recognize that if 
the “deal is good enough, it is rational to refuse to roll the dice, 
regardless of whether one believes the evidence establishes guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and regardless of whether one is 
factually innocent.”79 
 
73. Id. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Indiana, 901 N.E.2d 490, 493-94 (Ind. 2009) (holding if a 
plea agreement contains a provision that the prosecutor will “recommend” a specific 
sentence for the court to impose in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea, the plea 
agreement is a “specific sentence bargain” that is binding on the court and the parties 
unless there are circumstances demonstrating that the parties intended the agreement to 
be an open plea agreement). 
74. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1)(c). See also Dervan, supra note 70, at 12-13.  
75. Dervan, supra note 70, at 12. 
76 . Wes R. Porter, The Pendulum in Federal Sentencing Can Also Swing Toward 
Predictability: A Renewed Role for Binding Plea Agreements Post-Booker, 37 WM. MITCHELL 
L. REV. 469, 472-75 (2011). 
77. Id. at 485. 
78. Dervan & Edkins, supra note 6, at 14. 
79. Russell D. Covey, Longitudinal Guilt: Repeat Offenders, Plea Bargaining, and the 
Variable Standard of Proof, 63 FLA. L. REV. 431, 450 (2011). 
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B. Japan 
1. Informal plea bargaining 
Even before Japan’s reform of its Code of Criminal Procedure, 
scholars suggested informal plea bargaining was part and parcel of 
the criminal legal system.80 Some have estimated approximately 
ten to twenty percent of all criminal cases are disposed of through 
plea bargaining.81 Some have argued plea bargaining is even more 
common in Japan than the United States.82 In either case, the plea 
bargaining they describe is not a plea bargain narrowly defined 
where a prosecutor encourages the accused to confess guilt and 
waive his right to trial in exchange for leniency. Instead, scholars 
recognize plea bargaining in Japan to occur where (1) defendants 
have a choice between simple procedures and complicated 
procedures; and (2) there is systemic pressure for police and 
prosecutors to encourage defendants to “cooperate” by choosing 
the simple model.83 
Japan has long met both requirements for plea bargaining. Its 
Code of Criminal Procedure offers both simple and complex modes 
of case processing. Under standards set by the procuracy, the 
police need not, and routinely do not, report those they have found 
committing “minor” offenses (bizai shobun).84 “Minor” is defined 
broadly to include otherwise serious offenses such as assault, theft, 
fraud, and gambling.85 
Separately, Japanese prosecutors have “unrestricted 
authority” to and routinely do suspend the prosecution (kiso yūyo 
shobun) of suspects that they have determined are guilty.86 They 
 
80. Gotou, supra note 18, at 2; David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 
143. 
81. David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 155. 
82. J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So 
High?, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 53, 57 (2001); David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 
140. 
83. David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 142. 
84. Haley, supra note 19, at 2. 
85. Id. In 2012, Japanese police did not report 31.6 percent of those they had evidence 
to charge. Id. 
86 . Id. In 2012, of the 1.4 million persons police reported to the prosecutors, 
prosecutors suspended prosecution for the majority, 55.5 percent, of those deemed to 
have committed a crime.  
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do so based on Article 248 of Japan’s Code of Criminal Procedure: 
“[w]here prosecution is deemed unnecessary owing to the 
character, age, and environment of the offender, the gravity of the 
offense, and the circumstances or situation after the offense, 
prosecution need not be instituted.” 87  Japanese law scholars 
describe the discretion of prosecutors to indict, or not, as “almost 
unbounded.”88 
If the prosecutor does indict, Japan, like other civil law 
systems, requires a trial. 89  No person may be convicted of a 
criminal offense without judicial fact-finding and proof of guilt in 
addition to any confession or no-contest plea.90 Yet, prosecutors 
may seek to have minor offenses, often criminal traffic violations, 
tried via summary procedure, where guilt is determined in camera 
by a judge. 91 In other cases, where the defendant confesses, public 
trials may be streamlined, and most evidence written and 
introduced in the form of a dossier prepared by the police and 
prosecutors.92 
Finally, where guilt is contested, there is a public trial with 
witnesses called and evidence presented to the trier of fact.93 For 
serious crimes after 2009, that may involve presenting evidence to 
a lay judge panel (saiban-in).94 For those indicted who go to trial, 
the conviction rate is high, 99.5%.95 
At the same time, Japanese prosecutors “lack the time to 
prosecute any but a small fraction of suspects forwarded by the 
police.” 96  And Japanese prosecutors “face particularly stark 
 
87. Code of Criminal Procedure (Part I and Part II): Law No. 131 of July 10, 1948, 
JAPANESE LAW TRANSLATION, 
http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?ft=2&re=02&dn=1&yo=%E5%88
%91%E4%BA%8B%E8%A8%B4%E8%A8%9F%E6%B3%95&x=0&y=0&ia=03&ph=&k
y=&page=1 [https://perma.cc/Y9UW-9C9X] (last visited Dec. 19, 2020). 
88. Haley, supra note 19, at 3. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 142-43; Haley, supra note 19, 
at 10. 
92. David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 142-43. 
93. Id. at 143. 
94. Haley, supra note 19, at 3. Lay judges participate in all cases punishable by death 
or imprisonment for an indefinite period, as well as intentional offenses causing the death 
of a victim, such as homicide, robbery, and arson. 
95. Id. 
96. Ramseyer & Rasumsen, supra note 82, at 54. 
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incentives to win cases.”97 They are part of a national bureaucracy, 
where ability is measured by win rates and conviction rates, and, 
according to some observers, “losing a case is a sure path to 
demotion.”98 The pressure to convict is great. The potential cost of 
taking a case to trial is great. 
Because summary procedures and uncontested trials present 
less risk and impose less of a burden, prosecutors create incentives 
for defendants to choose those procedures.99 Interviews show that 
prosecutors may suggest to suspects that confessions will be 
rewarded with a suspended prosecution or reduced sentence 
recommendation.100 They may promise summary prosecution in 
exchange for cooperation, or assure suspects they will leave the 
suspects’ spouses or bosses alone if they provide information.101 
There are reported cases of prosecutors offering complete 
immunity from prosecution to a defendant in exchange for 
information regarding other defendants.102 
In short, even before Japan’s adoption of its plea bargaining 
system, Japan had charge and sentence plea bargaining, and 
immunity agreements just like those found in the United States. 
Even before Japan’s adoption of its plea bargaining system, field 
research showed that defendants’ confessions and cooperation 
were rewarded with lenient treatment. 103  And for those who 
refuse to cooperate? The “denial tariff” (hininryo) and sentencing 
differentials await.104 
At the same time, there are important differences between 
plea bargaining in Japan and the United States.105 One journalist 
covering Japan’s procuracy described it as follows: 
 
97. Id. at 61. 
98 . Id. While the internal pressure may be great, the Japanese procuracy, as an 
institution, is remarkable for its independence “from external pressures, especially 
political intervention.” Haley, supra note 19, at 5. 
99. David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 140-47. 
100. Id. at 144-47. 
101. Id. at 146. 
102. Id.  
103. Id. at 145-47. 
104 . Id. at 146. In Japan, they call the harsher sentence sought to punish an 
uncooperative defendant a denial tariff (hininryo). Id. at 144. 
105. Id. at 148. 
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Plea bargaining in Japan is usually tacit (anmoku) and indirect 
(kansetsu teki). In the US it is explicit (meikaku). This is the 
main difference. We don’t make written records of it. Our 
prosecutors communicate with suspects by [subtle 
communication] (haragei).106 
This “subtle communication” comes at a cost. There is the loss of 
trust that arises when the law deviates from practice. Perhaps 
more important, informal plea bargaining precludes formal 
protection for the defendants. Defendants cannot challenge 
prosecutors for reneging on deals, when the deal is implied and 
unwritten. 107  And defendants have little means to evaluate the 
fairness of the deal when similar cases go unrecorded. That lack of 
transparency enables corruption, or at least favoritism. 
It is widely believed that “old-boy prosecutors” [who retire 
from the procuracy and] who become defense attorneys (“old-
boy” lawyers) have an especially big influence on their former 
colleagues . . . Since prosecutors are more likely to trust former 
judges and prosecutors to keep their promises, they are more 
likely to enter into agreements with them. 108 
There is arguably a need to make transparent, and hence fairer, the 
de facto plea bargaining that some describe as inevitable.109 
Prosecutors in Japan, however, offered a different argument 
for legalizing plea bargaining. With increasing rights 
consciousness, and more adversarial defense lawyering, 
confessions have become increasingly difficult to obtain. 110  By 
granting prosecutors the explicit authority to bargain, especially 
when soliciting information about bigger offenses and offenders, 
prosecutors will be able to bring to justice those who are often 
 
106. Id. at 152-53 (the literal translation is “belly art”). Professor Johnson reached a 
similar conclusion: “Plea bargaining is also more often tacit and implicit in Japan than in 
the United States. A deal is not recorded in writing, of course, because doing so would 
document an illegal act. Moreover, most offers are made and most deals are struck 
indirectly, through innuendo and inference more than through clearly articulated 
negotiations.” Id. at 157. 
107. Id. at 163. 
108. Id. at 154. 
109. Ryan Y. Park, supra note 39, at 579 (in countries without formal plea bargaining, 
substitute mechanisms for pre-trial settlement developed “out of necessity.”).  
110. Johnson, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 163. 
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more difficult to charge and to convict—"corrupt officials and 
other white-collar offenders.”111 
At the same time, scholars have suggested that there are 
features of the criminal legal system in Japan that may help to 
ensure that confessions induced through plea bargains rest on an 
adequate factual basis.112  Except for summary procedure cases, 
there is no condemnation without adjudication. All serious cases 
get tried in a court of law.113 
One might question the extent of judicial review in an 
uncontested trial, but the mechanism for an independent review 
exists and there is motive to do so, at least initially. The idea of 
“trading justice” (shihou torihiki) is “appalling” to many Japanese, 
antithetical to the criminal justice system’s “pursuit of truth” (jittai 
teki shinjitsu shugi).114 Plea bargains may, as a result, be subject to 
closer review by the courts.115 
They may also be subject to closer review by the prosecutor’s 
office. “[B]efore indicting a suspect, front-line prosecutors must 
obtain the approval of one or more of their superiors. This system 
of hierarchical review (kessai) requires the charging prosecutor to 
justify his or her findings of fact and selection of charges.”116 This 
internal review at the prosecutor’s office seeks to ensure that cases 
have been “thoroughly investigated, analyzed, and discussed.”117 
 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 158. 
113. Id.  
114. Id. at 141; KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. Crim. Pro.] 2018, art. 1 (Japan).  Scholars interpret 
art. 1 of the Code as seeking to “reveal the truth of the case” and codifying the “doctrine of 
substantial justice” (jittai teki shinjitsu shugi), which suggests that resolution of the case 
must be based on a finding of the facts that is as close as possible to the truth of the matter.  
See, e.g., KEIJI SOSHOUHOU 29 (Sanshusha ed., 2008); Miyaki, Dai 3 Kou Keiji Soshou no 
Mokuteki, OWC, https://ocw.nagoya-u.jp/files/359/miyaki3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AZG6-A3EV] (last visited Nov. 18, 2020). 
115. David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 141; KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. 
Crim. Pro.] 2018, art. 1(Japan). See Haley, supra note 19, at 7 (“Public confidence in the 
criminal justice system in Japan is almost unrivaled . . . . Ensuring that trust by ‘realizing 
justice’ (seigi no jitsugen) is an overarching aim.”). 
116. David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining, supra note 34, at 158. 
117. Id. 
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2. Formal Plea Bargaining 
Against this backdrop, Japan amended its Code of Criminal 
Procedure, effective June 1, 2018. In the section on district court 
proceedings, the code now includes a chapter titled, not “plea 
bargaining” (shihou torihiki), but “Cooperation in Gathering 
Evidence and Other Matters & Agreements Regarding 
Prosecution.”118 In it, the Code sets out a formal mechanism for 
negotiating, memorializing, and enforcing certain plea bargain 
agreements. 
Section 1 addresses procedures for negotiating agreements 
between the prosecutor and accused. 119  Section 2 establishes 
special rules for trial procedures relating to bargained pleas.120 
Section 3 addresses procedures for ending the agreement,121 and 
Section 4 sets out procedures for ensuring performance of the 
agreement.122 
The code recognizes plea bargaining agreements for 
enumerated crimes, entered into with the consent of the accused’s 
attorney, where a prosecutor agrees not to indict or to indict only 
on certain charges, in exchange for the accused providing 
information about specified crimes committed by a third party.123 
a. The Parties to the Bargain 
Prosecutors, prosecutorial staff (kensatsu jimukan), and 
members of the national police (shihou keisatsu shokunin) are 
authorized to enter into plea bargaining agreements.124 They must 
negotiate a three-way agreement between the prosecutor, accused 
or defendant, and the defense attorney.125 As an exception, parts of 
the agreement may be negotiated solely with defense counsel if all 
parties consent.126 
 
118. KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. Crim. Pro.] 2018, pt. II, ch. IV (Japan). 
119. Id. arts. 350-2, 350-3. 
120. Id. arts. 350-4-7, 350-11. 
121. Id. art. 350-12. 
122. Id. arts. 350-13, 350-141515. 
123. Id. arts. 350-2, 350-3; Nichibenren, supra note 16, at 3. 
124. KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. CRIM. PRO.] 2018, art. 350-2(1) (Japan). 
125. Id. art. 350-4; Nichibenren, supra note 16, at 3. 
126. KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. Crim. Pro.] 2018, art. 350-4 (Japan). 
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The role of defense counsel in plea bargaining came late to the 
legislation. Debate in the Diet resulted in an amendment to the 
original bill requiring the agreement of defense counsel to ensure 
the transparency and reliability of the plea bargaining process.127 
The language in the statute makes defense counsel an 
indispensable part of the process; “[i]n order to reach an 
agreement, an attorney must consent.”128 The agreement must be 
reduced to writing, making clear the substance of the agreement, 
and it must be signed by the prosecutor, accused, and the accused’s 
attorney.129 
b. The Scope of the Bargain 
Plea bargaining agreements are possible only in cases 
involving an accused or defendant providing information about 
another case under investigation involving certain crimes.130 The 
bill provides an exclusive list of designated economic crimes that 
affect the public fisc; drug and weapons crimes; and crimes that 
interfere with the execution of public duties, including bribery, 
fraud, embezzlement, tax evasion, antitrust law violations, and 
securities law violations.131  Each is considered relatively difficult 
to detect or prosecute. 
With organized crime, low-level members are routinely 
prosecuted, but the investigations often fail to reach the crime 
bosses. With drug offenses, the prosecutors are again looking 
beyond the end user, seeking information regarding the seller, 
manufacturer, or importer of the prohibited drugs. With 
 
127. See Kai, supra note 22, at 1. 
128. KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. CRIM. PRO.] 2018, art. 350-3 (Japan). Japan requiring the 
participation of defense counsel finds support in the literature on plea bargaining where 
some have analogized the role of defense counsel in a plea bargaining negotiation to a 
mediator in civil litigation. There is a powerful argument that “the plea bargain should be 
seen as part of the broad conception of Alternative Dispute Resolution,” as defense counsel 
in such situations serve in a role virtually indistinguishable from that of a mediator. Gabriel 
Hallevy, Is ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) Philosophy Relevant to Criminal Justice?, 5 
ORIGINAL L. REV. 1 (2009) (emphasis added). 
129. KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. CRIM. PRO.] 2018, art. 350-3 (Japan). 
130. Id. art. 350-2. 
131 . Id. arts. 350-2, 350-3. See also Nichibenren, supra note 16, at 4; Mikio 
Yamaguchi, Nihonban Shihou Torihiki no Shikou ni Mukete: Yakuin ga Shitteoku beki koto, 
BUS. L.J. 65 (May 2018).  
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corruption, commentators again suggest there is rarely physical 
evidence, and, absent a confession, rarely prosecution.132 
When accused of one of these enumerated crimes, the 
defendant and defense counsel may agree: 
a) to provide truthful testimony to the prosecutor, the 
prosecutor’s assistant (kensatsu jimukan), or the (shihou 
keisatsu shokuin); 
b) to provide truthful testimony under examination when 
called as a witness to testify; 
c) to cooperate with the prosecutor or the prosecutor’s 
assistant (kensatsu jimukan), or the (shihou keisatsu shokuin) 
by submitting evidence or providing other necessary 
cooperation.133 
The drafters and Diet specifically considered and rejected pleas 
bargained in exchange for information an accused provides about 
a crime s/he personally committed, as found in the United 
States.134 
Not only must the information provided relate to a crime 
committed by another, amendments to the bill, submitted in 2015, 
added a section to the statute requiring a relationship between the 
crimes of the accused and that of the target investigation.135 The 
party entering into a plea bargaining agreement must be accused 
of a crime related to that allegedly committed by the party against 
whom information is sought.136 
In exchange for cooperation in the investigation or 
prosecution of another suspect, the prosecutor may agree to: 
1. not prosecute the accused; 
2. withdraw charges against the defendant; 
 
132. See, e.g., Nikkei, Shihou Torihiki, Nihon ni Netsuku? Soshiki Hanzai he no Kouka 
Kitai (June 11, 2018), 
https://style.nikkei.com/article/DGXZZO31388930V00C18A6000000/ 
[https://perma.cc/RMH8-MWPA]; Nihonban ‘Shihou Torihiki’ = ‘Goui Seido’ ga 6 Gatsu 1 
Nichi kara Hajimarimasu!!, ATOMU SHIKAWA FUNABASHI HOURITSU JIMUSHO (June 1, 2016). 
133. KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. CRIM. PRO.] 2018, art. 350-2(1)(a)-(c) (Japan). 
134. Kai, supra note 22, at 1. 
135 . Japan Ministry of Justice, Keiji Soshou Hou nado no Ichibu o Kaisei Suru 
Houritsuan ni Tai Suru Shuuseian, http://www.moj.go.jp/content/001321894.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6PLF-7YV2] (last visited July 20, 2017). 
136. See Gotou, supra note 18, at 4-5. 
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3. file only certain charges or seek only specified penalties; 
4. seek a change in the charges filed or penalties sought; 
5. submit an opinion letter regarding the appropriate sentence 
to be imposed on the defendant, pursuant to Art. 293(1); 
6. petition the court to utilize summary criminal procedures 
(sokketsu saiban tetsuzuki no moushitate); or 
7. seek a summary decision (ryakushiki meirei).137 
In summary, the statue provides prosecutors with broad discretion 
to charge or not, and if they do, to frame the charge and the penalty. 
c. The Bargaining Process 
As a result of the agreement, the prosecutor may demand the 
accused testify in another party’s criminal case.138 If a binding plea 
bargaining agreement is not formed, this testimony may not be 
used as evidence. 139  If the prosecutor files charges against the 
accused after entering into a plea bargain, the prosecutor must 
promptly disclose the agreement after the prosecutor reads the 
charging sheet.140 Similarly, if one of the parties violates the plea 
bargaining agreement, the prosecutor must promptly disclose this 
occurrence.141 
A prosecutor, the accused, his attorney, or the court on its own 
authority may demand production of any records or recordings of 
the testimony offered by a party to a plea bargaining agreement.142 
If a party is called as a witness and testifies pursuant to a plea 
bargaining agreement, the prosecutor must promptly disclose the 
agreement. 143  If a prosecutor files for summary judgment 
(ryakushiki meirei), he must submit to the court the plea bargaining 
agreement upon which it is based.144  
 
137. Id. at 10.  KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. CRIM. PRO.] 2018, art. 350-2(2)(a)-(g) (Japan); Kai, 
supra note 22, at 1. 
138.  KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. CRIM. PRO.] 2018, art. 350-5 (Japan). 
139. Id.  
140. Id. art. 291, 350-7. 
141. Id. 
142. Id.  art. 350-8. 
143. Id. art. 350-9. 
144. Id. art. 462. 
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Parties may terminate the agreement if one party violates its 
terms. 145  A defendant is also released from the terms of the 
agreement if the court rejects the charge or penalty proposed by 
the prosecutor pursuant to the terms of the agreement.146 If the 
prosecutor files suit in violation of the plea bargaining agreement, 
the court must dismiss the suit.147 If the prosecutor violates the 
plea bargaining agreement, the court may not use the accused’s 
testimony or the information gained therefrom as evidence, unless 
the accused consents to its use in his, her or a third person’s trial.148  
The new legislation also includes penalties if a suspect 
provides false information. 149  Provision of false testimony or 
manipulated evidence will result in a prison term of up to five 
years. This sentence may be lessened if recanted prior to trial of 
the accused or a third party.150 
Apart from formal recognition of plea bargaining, the 
legislation also creates a framework for authorizing prosecutorial 
immunity. When a witness has been or risks being charged with a 
crime and is scheduled to testify, the prosecutor may seek 
immunity for the witness.151 On weighing the importance of the 
testimony, the gravity of the offense, and other circumstances, the 
prosecutor can request the court issue an order, either before or 
during the hearing, that precludes the testimony from being used 
in a manner detrimental to the witness’s interests in criminal 
proceedings where the witness has been named a defendant.152 
d. The Consequences of the Bargain 
The list of economic crimes for which prosecutors may offer 
plea bargaining agreements has businesses worried. Prior to 
adoption, attorneys suggested the bill had the potential to 
dramatically change the investigation of white-collar crime in 
 
145. Id. art. 350-10. 
146. Id. art. 350-10(2)(i). 
147. Id. art. 350-13. 
148. Id. art. 350-14. 
149. Osaki, supra note 17.  
150. KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. CRIM. PRO.] 2018, art. 350-15 (Japan). 
151. Id. arts. 157-2, 157-3. 
152. Id.; NICHIBENREN, supra note 16, at 3. 
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Japan.153 In the past, low level employees may have been hesitant 
to testify regarding the acts of officers and directors for fear of 
implicating themselves. 154  Plea bargaining and offers of 
prosecutorial immunity threaten to increase such cooperation.155 
Commentators in the business community focused on the 
same risk.156 Japan’s antitrust act has long granted, in price-fixing 
cases, immunity to the first party to report the acts to Japan’s Fair 
Trade Commission. 157  Commentators saw the plea bargaining 
statute as an expansion of this type of investigation and an attempt 
to prevent corporations from collectively responding.158 The risk 
of a single employee, officer, or director, providing information 
against others or the company itself now creates the potential to 
pit individuals within the organizations against each other.159 
The arrest, prosecution, and ultimately flight of Carlos Ghosn 
from Japan proved these commentators correct. Setting aside 
whether Mr. Ghosn is guilty of the charges that he violated 
Japanese securities and corporate laws, some of Nissan’s internal 
email suggest that the initial reports to the prosecutors by high 
level executives seeking a plea bargain were motived, in part, by 
opposition to Mr. Ghosn’s push to further integrate Nissan and 
Renault. 160  They went to the prosecutors to “neutralize his 
initiatives.”161 
Concerns about Japan’s new plea bargaining system extend 
beyond the business community. Will the plea bargaining system 
increase the number of false accusations or charges? Will the plea 
bargaining system increase the risk that the accused or the 
defendant offer false testimony either intentionally or 
inadvertently? Will judges credit testimony secured as a result of 
 
153. See Kai, supra note 22, at 1. 
154. Id. at 2. 
155. See id. 
156. Hayashi, supra note 19. 
157. Id. 
158. Id. 
159. See id.; Kai, supra note 22, at 1-2. 
160. Reed Stevenson, Nissan email trail casts new light on takedown of Carlos Ghosn, 
JAPAN TIMES (June 15, 2020), 
https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/06/15/business/corporate-business/nissan-
carlos-ghosn-takedown [https://perma.cc/Y939-F24V]. 
161. Id. 
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plea bargaining, or will the number of decisions exonerating 
defendants increase? 
Even if the prosecutor seeks a reduced sentence as part of an 
agreement with a defendant, there are no guarantees that the judge 
will impose a reduced sentence. And, even if the prosecutor agrees 
not to file charges, there remains the possibility that a Prosecution 
Review Commission (Kansatsu Shinsakai) may find grounds to 
prosecute.162 
In light of these concerns, Japan’s Supreme Prosecutor’s Office 
instructed its prosecutors, in a March 19, 2018 directive, to 
exercise restraint in using the plea bargaining system and, for each 
case, coordinate with and follow instructions from an appellate-
level prosecutor’s office. 163  The early plea bargaining cases, 
implicating pillars of Japan’s business community, suggest 
prosecutors will not hesitate to use their new authority. 164  The 
question remains, should they? 
C. South Korea 
South Korea presents similar questions: is there informal plea 
bargaining? If so, will formal plea bargaining displace informal 
practices? Those questions are answered in the context of a 
criminal justice system that resembles, in important respects, 
Japan’s.  
South Korea’s legal system, like that of Japan, is part of the 
Civil Law tradition, heavily influenced first by German law and 
later by American legal principles.165 At the same time, “[w]hen 
Japan colonized South Korea (1905-1945), it imposed many of its 
 
162. Haley, supra note 19, at 8 (“These citizen commissions have the power to review 
and override prosecutor decisions to indict or not indict.”). 
163. Min. of Justice, Houmu Daijin Kakugigo Kishakaiken no Gaiyou (June 1, 2018), 
moj.go.jp/hisho/kouhou/hisho08_01009.html; Nihonban ‘Shihou Torihiki’ = ‘Goui Seido’, 
supra note 132. 
164. See Thai bribery case leads to Japan’s first plea bargain, supra note 30. (Tokyo 
prosecutors agreed to forego indictment of an employee of Mitsubishi Hitachi Power 
Systems, Ltd. accused of bribing a Thai civil servant, in exchange for cooperation in the 
prosecutor’s investigation of the employer). 
165. See, e.g., Jootaek Lee, A research guide and bibliography for Korean law resources 
in English, GLOBALEX, 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/South_Korean_Legal_Resources1.html 
[https://perma.cc/62US-2NQ7] (last visited Aug. 5, 2018). 
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own institutions and procedures of criminal justice. As a result, the 
two systems of criminal justice closely resemble each other.”166  
Given this similarity, scholars have suggested that “[i]f the 
Japanese models of case processing produce [informal] plea 
bargaining practices . . . then we should expect to find more 
similarities in quantity and style of plea bargaining in South 
Korea.”167 
1. Informal Plea Bargaining 
South Korean law practitioners and scholars confirm that 
informal plea bargaining occurs regularly. One practitioner-
scholar suggests there are already mechanisms in place, including 
self-confession, summary trial procedures, and consent of 
evidence, that function like plea bargaining.168 Another criminal 
law scholar, with prior experience as an economic crime 
investigator with Korea’s national police agency, states: “[i]t is an 
open secret that the prosecutor’s conduct negotiations informally 
in criminal proceedings.”169 
In practice, this occurs in one of two ways: a prosecutor may 
informally encourage a defendant to plead guilty in exchange for a 
lesser sentence.170 Or a prosecutor may offer to investigate only 
one of several potential charges. 171  This charge and sentence 
bargaining is similar to what one finds in Japan and the United 
States. 
Informal plea bargaining in South Korea is, however, 
influenced by different institutional factors. Prosecutors are 
 
166. David T. Johnson, Prosecution of Corruption, supra note 45, at 162. 
167. Id. 
168 . Roh Myeong Seon, Sae-lo-un jin-sul-jeung-geo hwag-bo-bang-an-e gwan-han 
gae-jeong (Amendment on Expansion of Evidence), at 15. 
169. Park Paper, supra note 51, at 4.  In OECD reports on the OECD Antibribery 
Convention, South Korea reports that with no plea bargaining procedures available in 
South Korea, the prosecutor’s discretion to discontinue criminal proceedings based on a 
defendant’s cooperation in an investigation serves as a basis to obtain cooperation in an 
investigation. Implementing the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention: Korea Phase 4 Report, 
OECD, 43-44, 
http://www.mofa.go.kr/eng/brd/m_5463/down.do?brd_id=8118&seq=318890&data_tp
=A&file_seq=1 (last visited Nov. 20, 2020). 
170. Interview with Dr. Re-Seop Park, Hallym University (July 28, 2017) (on file with 
the authors) [hereinafter Park Interview]; Park Paper, supra note 51, at 4. 
171. Park Interview, supra note 170; Park Paper, supra note 51, at 4. 
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enormously powerful in South Korea.172 So much so that scholars 
have labeled South Korea’s criminal legal system “prosecutorial 
justice.”173 Some have suggested that prosecutors wield “absolute 
power and authority over defendants.”174 
In contrast to Japan, where the police “independently handle 
virtually all reported crimes” and are “not subject to prosecutorial 
direction or supervision,” 175  in South Korea, prosecutors often 
control the investigations: the police are a subordinate “helping” 
agency. 176 Prosecutors have the authority to investigate matters 
independent of the police. 177  While most criminal offenses are 
reported to the police, prosecutors can intervene in an 
investigation at any time. 178  They also have the authority to 
investigate matters independent of the police.179 Police officers are 
permitted to arrest without a warrant only when the suspect is 
caught in the act or when there is a risk of flight.180 In all other 
cases, only the prosecutor has authority to request the issuance of 
a warrant.181 
In South Korea, there is neither a grand jury system nor 
private prosecution.182 The prosecutor has exclusive authority to 
institute a criminal action.183 And the South Korean prosecutor has 
 
172. Park Interview, supra note 170; Park Paper, supra note 51, at 1. 
173. David T. Johnson, Prosecution of Corruption, supra note 45, at 51, 61. 
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“almost unlimited discretion” in deciding whether a particular 
crime should be prosecuted. 184 
The prosecutor may grant a reprieve from indictment after 
considering, inter alia, the suspect’s age, character and likely 
motive.185 “[U]nder their judgment, a suspect may be brought to a 
trial or walk away.” 186  If they go to trial, prosecutors will 
recommend a penalty at the time they seek a guilty verdict,187 and 
judges routinely follow this recommendation.188 
That “almost unlimited discretion” is exercised jointly within 
the prosecutor’s office. As in Japan, front-line prosecutors in Korea 
“routinely ‘consult’ with their superiors about disposition 
decisions—whether to arrest, detain, indict, and so on.” 189  This 
practice of “consultation and approval” (gyeljae) is “one of the main 
mechanisms for ensuring that like cases are treated alike across 
different prosecutor offices . . . and across different prosecutors 
within the same office.”190 
In summary, the prosecutors, collectively, wield enormous 
power in the South Korean criminal justice system.191 They decide 
who to investigate and what to investigate. They decide who to 
charge and what to charge. And with that power, comes the power 
to encourage cooperation. 
As in Japan, all defendants who plead guilty stand trial. There 
is no arraignment system in Korea.192 Yet, as in Japan, trial can take 
different forms. If the crime is minor, punishable by a fine not 
exceeding S. Kor.₩200,000 (approximately US$200), a police 
station chief may request that a judge sentence a defendant by 
summary judgment, without a public trial.193 Where prosecutors 
 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Kwoncheol Lee, Criminal Law and Procedure, in INTRODUCTION TO KOREAN LAW 
155, 181 (Korea Legislation Research Institute ed., 2013). 
187. Park Interview, supra note 170. 
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191. Park Interview, supra note 170. 
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seek imposition of a fine or confiscation of property, they may 
submit a dossier of evidence for the court’s review, and seek the 
court’s entry of a summary order, without pubic trial. 194  If the 
accused confesses, the prosecutor may petition the court to utilize 
summary trial procedures, where the judge may review the 
evidence and sentence the accused, without his or her appearance. 
195 This abridged trial may take less than ten minutes.196 
The result is that in South Korea, as in Japan, prosecutors have 
choices in deciding whether or not to charge a defendant and 
whether or not to utilize abbreviated procedures resulting in 
lesser sentences. As in Japan, they have an incentive to encourage 
the defendant’s cooperation and use of summary procedures, 
because doing so conserves resources. That incentive has grown as 
the demands on the prosecutors and the courts have grown.197 
In 2008, South Korea introduced a jury system, where serious 
crimes—cases punishable by capital punishment, life 
imprisonment, or a sentence of one-year imprisonment or more—
are now prosecuted before a mixed panel of three judges and up to 
nine jurors. 198  These crimes include not only violent crime 
resulting in death or serious injury, but also white collar crimes, 
including bribery and embezzlement. 199  After additional legal 
reforms, including institution of the right to counsel during 
examination, adoption of an exclusionary rule for evidence 
obtained in violation of due process, a victim compensation act, 
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and sentencing reform, 200  Korean scholars now describe the 
criminal justice system as “overloaded.”201 Proponents argue that 
a plea bargaining system could help alleviate the burden.202 
2. Formal Plea Bargaining Proposed 
In 2004, a Supreme Court committee in South Korea 
announced its plans to begin study of a plea bargaining system for 
its courts.203 Shortly thereafter, proponents in the Korean National 
Assembly began urging its adoption. They argued it “contributes to 
the protection of defendants by enhancing lawsuit’s efficiency.”204   
Just as the ABA argued in its 1967 report, a 2005 Korean 
National Assembly report argued that plea bargaining would 
enable most cases to be handled quickly, allowing those where 
guilt is contested to move more quickly through the legal 
system.205 Delay for the accused, it was argued, is an injustice, and 
delay for the prosecutors precludes them from focusing on more 
pressing cases.206 The goal was to “maximize judicial effectiveness 
and eradicate corruption, while guaranteeing that a defendant who 
pleads innocent is given the fullest and fairest legal process 
possible.”207 
Second, they recognized that informal plea bargaining occurs, 
and a formal process can codify safeguards to ensure the defendant 
does not make an “ill-informed” decision.208 The Korean Assembly 
report suggested requiring an attorney to participate in the plea 
bargaining process, a safeguard the Japanese subsequently 
enacted in their statute.209 The report also suggested requiring that 
the defendant plead guilty in the presence of a judge.210 Finally, it 
argued that a formal plea bargaining system encouraging 
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defendants with sufficient evidence to plead guilty will facilitate 
rehabilitation by allowing “prompt correctional procedures.”211 
The report found concern about the abuse of prosecutorial 
powers exaggerated given the protections in the Criminal 
Procedure Act, vigilant oversight by civic groups and the press, and 
judicial oversight in deciding a defendant’s guilt and the severity of 
the sentence.212 “[I]f a judge explains in detail to a defendant, the 
consequences of his or her pleading guilty, plea bargaining can 
contribute to enhancing fairness.”213 At the same time, the National 
Assembly report recognized that plea bargaining could conflict 
with the criminal justice system’s truth-seeking function by 
encouraging bargained compromise; that it could result in 
sentence disparity among defendants who accept a plea bargain 
and those who do not; and that in cases involving multiple 
defendants, the most culpable could get lighter sentences.214 
This debate stalled for a number of years. Then, in 2008, 
Korea’s Supreme Prosecutor’s Office formed a study group,215 and 
the Ministry of Justice began drafting legislation recognizing plea 
bargaining. 216  In 2010, the Ministry of Justice announced 
legislation to introduce a plea bargaining system in South Korea.217 
It was simple in form and focused on crimes of violence, 
corruption, and terrorism.218 As referenced above, Article 247 of 
the Criminal Procedure Act affords prosecutors broad discretion to 
prosecute, or not, based on the same general principles considered 
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in determining punishment. 219  These principles include 
consideration of the age, character and conduct, intelligence and 
environment of the offender; the offender’s relation to the victim; 
the motive for the crime, means, and result; and circumstances 
after the commission of the crime.220   
The proposed legislation sought to add to the prosecutor’s 
discretion. Proposed Article 247(2)(1) provided prosecutors the 
authority not to prosecute persons offering testimony 
“indispensable to a criminal investigation” related to crimes of 
violence, corruption, and terrorism. 221  Procedurally, Article 
247(2)(2) required only a signed written statement setting out the 
specifics of the agreement, including the charge, facts constituting 
the offense, applicable laws, and testimony of the unindicted 
person.222 Article 247(2)(3) then provided immunity: “A person, 
who has given written testimony pursuant to Art 247(2)(2), cannot 
be prosecuted.”223 
The legislation failed to pass.224  Backlash arose from those 
concerned about an already powerful procuracy, “where the 
prosecution monopolizes the investigation and prosecution 
right.” 225  Underlying this concern about the lack of checks and 
balances on the authority of the prosecutor, was a deep-seated 
concern about abuse of power in the criminal justice system.226  
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When Japan occupied Korea, Japan’s resident-general 
administered the criminal courts and used criminal procedure as 
an instrument of power. 227  During the authoritarian regimes 
following World War II, criminal law continued to be “a symbol of 
authoritarian rule.”228 The democratization movement that began 
during the June Struggle of 1987, began with the death of a 
dissident student tortured during police interrogation.229 
Those concerns about abuse of power in the criminal justice 
system overlay criticism about its inconsistent use. Protests 
regarding outsized disparities in judicial outcomes and sometimes 
too lenient sentencing gave rise to the Korean National Assembly 
establishing a Sentencing Commission in 2007.230 The Sentencing 
Commission enacted sentencing guidelines identifying seven types 
of crime, each with its own sentencing factors and sentencing 
range. 231  The guidelines sought to guarantee fair and objective 
sentencing. 232  According to some, plea bargaining would 
reintroduce inequity into the system.233 
While the 2010 bill failed to pass, the issue failed to go away. 
The debate over plea bargaining in South Korea continues. Apart 
from the increased burden felt by prosecutors as legal reforms 
have offered increased procedural rights to the accused, 
prosecutors have voiced concern about conviction rates and 
difficulties in obtaining convictions in recent high-profile 
corruption cases.234 
While prosecutors wield enormous power within the criminal 
legal system, the tools they have to investigate are limited. South 
Korean prosecutors have limited authority to conduct wiretaps 
and undercover stings.235 They have no formal authority to plea 
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bargain or grant immunity to cooperating suspects and 
witnesses. 236  Without these “essential” tools for gathering 
evidence in corruption cases, they rely on interrogation.237 Some 
suggest that “[t]o forbid particular investigative techniques is to 
condone the crimes those techniques are best suited to solve.”238 
In December 2017, South Korea’s Supreme Prosecutor’s 
Office again proposed formal recognition of plea bargaining in 
Korea.239 And the Ministry of Justice is again considering adoption 
of a criminal immunity statute for “inside witness[es].”240 While 
neither agency has published proposed legislation yet, 
commentators have described the new proposal as an “inside 
witness criminal immunity system,” providing prosecutors with 
the authority to reduce a criminal sentence if the accused confesses 
or provides testimony regarding others.241  The focal points are 
again organized crime and corporate corruption. 242  The intent, 
again, is to provide immunity to certain defendants if they provide 
information regarding others.243 Scholars describe this proposed 
legislation as “similar” to Japan’s newly adopted plea bargaining 
system seeking to encourage cooperation in gathering evidence in 
exchange for an agreement regarding prosecution.244  
Advocates for introducing a plea bargaining system in South 
Korea argue that it is necessary to regulate the informal plea 
bargaining that happens as a matter of course.245 They continue to 
argue that a formal plea bargaining system will increase 
transparency and protect human rights. 246 They argue that 
introduction of a plea bargaining system in South Korea will reduce 
the burden on the criminal justice system, and they now point to 
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Germany. 247  In 2009, Germany introduced a plea bargaining 
system recognizing the “disposition of the parties as a contract 
between the suspect and the state.”248 
Significant concerns, however, remain. 249  South Korean 
scholars argue that plea bargaining is ill-suited to the South Korean 
criminal justice system, both philosophically and procedurally. 250 
They continue to see a fundamental conflict between plea 
bargaining and the criminal justice system’s truth-finding 
function.251 In South Korea, as in Japan and Germany, justice is not 
a value to be “bargained.”252 “Plea bargaining is highly likely to lead 
to results that may go against the basic principles of criminal 
justice systems, which are to seek truth and reach a fair decision, 
by making a compromise with criminals for the benefit of 
investigative authorities and the prosecution.”253 
They also argue that, absent broader procedural reform, plea 
bargaining is ill-suited to the South Korean criminal justice 
system. 254  Scholars speak of the need to address an existing 
“imbalance of advantage” by strengthening controls over 
prosecutors’ “overgrown powers.”255 Prosecutors already play a 
“dominant role” in South Korea’s criminal justice system.256 There 
is a need to balance the interests of efficiency with fairness.257 
Absent that rebalancing through broader procedural reform, 
scholars express concern about the risk of returning to the old 
inquisitorial system, where a prosecutor has authority to 
investigate, prosecute, and de facto adjudicate. 258  They see few 
constraints coming from a judge with no authority to investigate 
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the case and no information about the case until evidence is 
presented at trial. 259 They find it unlikely that defendants, even 
with the help of counsel, can bargain with prosecutors on an equal 
basis.260 And they see a real risk that failed negotiations will lead 
to retribution in the form of a prosecutor demanding a heavier 
punishment than originally proposed.261 
These concerns are exacerbated by concerns about the 
inequity that currently arises from “favored relationships” (jeon-
gwan-ye-u), where former prosecutors and judges find favor in the 
courts after they return to the practice of law.262 Similar to the “old-
boy” network documented in Japan, 263  in South Korea when a 
former judge or prosecutor is appointed as defense counsel, the 
defendant is more likely to receive a not-guilty verdict or a reduced 
sentence.264 The former judge or prosecutor is, as a result, able to 
demand higher attorney’s fees. 265  Some defendants, as a result, 
receive more lenient sentences than others—an issue the 
Sentencing Commission sought to address.266 The concern is that 
plea bargaining will exacerbate the problem, magnifying 
unfairness already in the system.267 
In short, many oppose the introduction of plea bargaining 
absent broader reforms. Conferring more power on the 
prosecutor, through expanded authority to wiretap, conduct 
stings, plea bargain and offer immunity may reduce corruption, but 
it will exacerbate the imbalance of power in the criminal justice 
system.268 Yet, the prosecutors want it, and the need remains the 
same. 269  South Korea’s Supreme Prosecutor’s Office and the 
Ministry of Justice are pushing now for amendment to the Criminal 
Procedure Act recognizing formal plea bargaining, to better 
investigate corruption and reduce the burden on prosecutors. 
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III. PLEA BARGAINING IN THE LABORATORY—A COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
In the midst of this push to introduce formal plea bargaining 
systems in Japan and now South Korea, and the growing concern 
in the United States over the innocence problem its plea bargaining 
system has created, the Authors engaged in a multi-year 
international collaboration with law and psychology researchers 
to administer psychological studies to test the prevalence of false 
pleas of guilty by the innocent in each country. Our findings show 
not only that false pleas of guilty in response to the pressures of 
plea bargaining is a global problem, i.e., it transcends borders and 
legal jurisdictions, but also that significant numbers of defendants 
are willing to falsely testify against others in official proceedings to 
secure the benefits of those bargains. 
A. Study Methodology 
Building on methodology used previously to study false 
confessions, 270  a plea bargaining paradigm was investigated in 
each country, in a controlled laboratory setting, utilizing college 
students as participants. The goal was to mirror real-world plea 
bargaining conditions as closely as possible in a laboratory, by 
accusing students of academic dishonesty and offering them a plea. 
We also sought to add to the prior paradigm by adding aspects 
reflective of the procedural protections adopted in Japan and being 
considered in South Korea to test whether those mechanisms for 
making the plea system more reliable were effective. 
While academic discipline is not precisely equivalent to 
traditional criminal penalties, the anxiety experienced by students 
accused of cheating and anticipating punishment is similar in form 
to the anxiety experienced by one charged with a criminal offense. 
There are also procedural similarities with students able to contest 
guilt at a hearing, akin to a trial. Punishments may similarly require 
students to forfeit time, money, and freedom. These various 
similarities enable a meaningful comparison. 
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In this study, participants were placed in a situation in which 
cheating with a fellow student may or may not have occurred, yet 
all were accused of academic dishonesty. As such, this study 
recreated the innocent defendant’s dilemma by presenting two 
difficult choices to students and asking them to make a decision: 
plead guilty to academic dishonesty and receive a lighter 
punishment or contest guilt and potentially receive a harsher 
punishment. This is the same decision defendants in the criminal 
justice system make every day. 
As discussed above, Japan has adopted and South Korea is 
debating a plea bargaining system that recognizes plea bargaining 
only where the accused offers information regarding others. The 
focal point is securing information regarding other targets of the 
investigation and rewarding that cooperation with a reduced 
sentence.  To account for this, our experiment was divided into two 
studies. The first tested conditions relating to self-incrimination, 
severity of sentence, and implicating others. The second study 
introduced additional steps to test participants’ willingness to 
provide incriminating evidence about a putative colleague. 
In the United States, participants were college students 
attending a small university in Florida. In Japan, the participants 
were students at a large university with campuses in Kyoto and 
Osaka. In South Korea, the participants were students at a small 
university in Seoul and a larger one outside the capital. 
We ran the experiment using similar Japanese, Korean, and 
English language scripts and procedures. The goal, in each case, 
was to better understand what motivates people to plead guilty 
and the interaction between the incentives to maintain innocence, 
plead guilty and/or falsely accuse. In each iteration of the study, 
the study participants signed up for what they believed was a 
psychological inquiry into individual versus group problem-
solving. When the study participant arrived for the problem-
solving experiment, s/he was met by another student pretending 
to be participating in the exercise as well. Unbeknownst to the 
study participant, the second student was actually a confederate 
working with the researchers. 
At this point, a research assistant, also working with the 
Authors, led the two students into a private room and explained 
the testing procedures. The research assistant informed the 
students that they would be participating in an experiment about 
2020] BARGAINED JUSTICE 499 
performance on logic problems. According to the research 
assistant, the two students would be left alone to first complete 
three logic problems together as a team and, after that, the 
students would receive three additional logic problems that must 
be completed individually. 
When the individual problems were distributed, the research 
assistant stated: “Now I will hand out the individual problems, 
remember that you are to work alone.” In fact, in one half of the 
study the confederate encouraged the participant to cheat and 
work together. In half of the cases, the confederate asked the study 
participant for assistance in answering the questions, a clear 
violation of the instructions. First, the confederate asked the study 
participant: “What did you get for No. 2?” If the study participant 
did not respond with the answer, the confederate followed up by 
saying, “I think it is . . . .” If necessary, the confederate asked for 
assistance with additional problems: “Did you get . . . for No. 3?” 
Those study participants who acquiesced and offered assistance 
were placed in the “guilty condition,” because they “cheated” by 
violating the research assistant’s instructions. 
In the other half of the cases, the confederate sat quietly and 
did not ask the study participant for assistance. Absent 
unprompted attempts to cheat initiated by the participant, those in 
this scenario were placed in the “innocent condition,” because they 
did not “cheat” by violating the research assistant’s instructions. 
After completing the second set of logic problems, the 
research assistant, who did not know whether cheating occurred, 
collected the logic problems and asked that the students remain in 
the room while the problems were graded. Approximately five 
minutes later, the research assistant reentered the room and 
indicated there was a problem and asked to speak to the students 
individually. The research assistant looked at the sign-in sheet and 
read off the confederate’s name and the two then left the room 
together. 
Five minutes later, the research assistant reentered the room, 
sat down near the study participant, and made the following 
statement: “You and the other student had the same wrong answer 
on the second and third individual questions. The chances of you 
both getting the exact same wrong answer are really small—in fact 
they are like less than 4%—because of this, when this occurs, we 
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are required to report it to the professor in charge and she may 
consider this a form of academic dishonesty.”271 
The research assistant then informed the student that this had 
occurred before and that she had been given authority to offer two 
alternatives. The first alternative was to admit to the academic 
dishonesty, lose any promised compensation, and the student’s 
academic advisor would be informed of the dishonesty. This 
alternative was akin to receiving a promise of probation—the 
defendant could leave without future proceedings (assuming the 
probation rules were met), but there was the stigma of criminal, or 
in our case “cheater”, attached to the decision. 
The second alternative offered to the participant mimicked 
the decision to go to trial. Students were told they could contest the 
accusation. They were told the professor in charge would bring the 
incident to an academic review board. In the study, the 
descriptions of the academic review board and procedures utilized 
varied slightly depending on the location of the experiment.272 In 
general, to make the review board sound similar to a jury or panel 
of lay-judges in a criminal trial, the research assistant described it 
as being a forum in which the student had the option of telling his 
or her version of events, presenting evidence, and arguing for his 
or her position. 
The panel was generally described as a board of faculty and 
staff who would hear the incident and decide if academic 
dishonesty had occurred. Students were told that if the board 
found no academic dishonesty (i.e., if they were acquitted) then 
they would receive the compensation owed to them for the study. 
If the board found academic dishonesty (i.e., if they were found 
guilty), then they would lose the compensation, the academic 
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advisor would be informed of the incident, and one of two 
punishments would be conveyed. 
Half the students were offered a “harsh” sentencing condition 
and the other half were offered a “lenient” sentencing condition to 
test the impact of “sentencing differentials” on the rate of innocent 
and guilty students accepting the plea offer. In the lenient 
condition, students were told they would need to attend an 8-hour 
seminar on ethics training with a pass/fail exam at the end. In the 
harsh condition, students were told they must attend the seminar, 
pass the exam, and also complete 10 hours of community 
service.273 
The two punishments were meant to test the effect of 
sentence disparity on decisions to plea. While there was no threat 
to students of actual incarceration—as a jail or prison sentence 
does—there was a threat to their time, which represented a 
deprivation of liberty interests. 
To further mirror the actual process of deciding whether to 
accept a plea deal, the participant was provided with a form of 
“representation” that was meant to serve the function of counsel. 
Before the participants elected to plead or contest the charges, the 
experimenter informed the participant of their right to have an 
advocate in situations such as these. The experimenter then 
presented a one-page document from a “student advocate” 
available to represent students in cases of possible academic 
dishonesty. The paper reiterated the right to the review board and 
the right to defend oneself in front of the board. A phone number 
was provided for students to call if they chose the review board 
option. 
One might argue that the advice a defense attorney provides 
is not adequately captured on a piece of paper outlining the 
implications of the decision, but this is often not far from what a 
 
273 . The lenient and harsh punishment conditions are slightly different in the 
current paradigm than the previous research—most notably, the lenient condition is less 
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typical public defender in the United States representing an 
individual charged with a minor offense provides. In 2011, the 
National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers (“NACDL”) 
concluded that individuals in misdemeanor cases are often 
processed with no attorney or with one that offers little more than 
a few minutes of time.274 Counsel’s access to the accused in Japan 
and South Korea may be similarly limited.275 
Finally, after the participant was presented with the rights of 
the accused document, the experimenter repeated the choices and 
added that if the participant chose the academic review board, 
s/he should be aware that over 80-90% of students appearing in 
front of the board are found guilty. This statement was intended as 
a low-end approximation of conviction rates in the United States, 
Japan, and South Korea, with the assumption that these high rates 
are communicated to most defendants by either the government 
or defense counsel.276 Once the study participants were presented 
with the option of pleading guilty or proceeding to the review 
board, the research assistant presented them with a piece of paper. 
The paper outlined their options and asked that they circle their 
selection. 
Plea bargaining in the United States allows an accused to 
receive a lighter sentence by either acknowledging personal guilt 
or providing incriminating evidence regarding another. 277  Most 
plea deals, nonetheless, typically require that the party cooperate 
with the government. In the United States, in some situations, this 
means the plea deals requires the defendant to provide 
information about or testify against a co-defendant. As discussed 
above, in Japan and South Korea, doing so is a prerequisite.278 
To examine this facet of plea bargaining, if a participant in 
Study 1 chose the plea deal, s/he was presented with a second 
sheet of paper asking him or her to indicate who instigated the 
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cheating. It was presented as the next step in the process, and 
participants were encouraged to complete the sheet. Upon 
completion, they also signed their names to this sheet, increasing 
the perception of the document as a binding agreement. 
For guilty individuals, making the decision to accept the deal 
likely increases cooperation. These individuals should be naturally 
primed by accepting the plea to move to the next logical step of 
implicating their “co-defendant.” For the innocent who accept the 
plea, Study 1 examines whether these individuals can rationalize 
implicating another person when they know that no actual 
wrongdoing took place. 
Study 2 focused more closely on this issue. If the participant 
chose to plead, the script required the participant identify the 
party who they provided assistance to or received assistance from. 
Participants who admitted to cheating were also asked to provide 
information to the academic review board regarding the cheating 
incident. In other words, in Study 2 a plea bargain depended on 
implicating another, rightly or wrongly. It tested the willingness of 
those in the non-cheat condition to falsely accuse a third party in 
exchange for a lighter punishment. It also tested the willingness of 
those in the non-cheat condition to testify against an innocent third 
party. 
It is important to note that both Studies 1 and 2 utilized 
safeguards similar to those employed in research on false 
confessions and in other deception studies to ensure the well-
being of the study participants. The research assistant was 
instructed to terminate the experiment and debrief the student 
regarding the true nature of the study if the student took too long 
to select an option, seemed overly stressed, or tried to leave the 
room. For those that completed the study, they were fully 
debriefed at the end. The experimenter explained the study and 
ensured that the participant left without distress. 
B. Study Results 
1. Pleading Rates in the United States 
In the 2013 study completed in the United States, 
approximately nine out of ten guilty study participants accepted 
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the plea deal, while six out of ten innocent study participants did.279 
Results from the current research in the United States showed 
similar trends: guilty participants plead at a high rate, but 
substantial numbers of innocent participants were also willing to 
plead. 
In the first study, a total of 204 individuals participated. 
Fourteen people were removed because they showed suspicion to 
the deception. The experimenter had to end eight sessions early 
due to distress on the part of the participant, evidence that the 
paradigm elicits some of the same psychological reactions as found 
in plea bargaining. One additional individual had to be excluded 
because the condition was not recorded. We also had a number of 
individuals (N=21) originally assigned to the “cheat” or “guilty” 
condition who had to be reassigned to “innocent” when our 
confederate’s attempts at cheating were unsuccessful or ignored. 
Of the remaining 181 participants, ages ranged from 18-25 
(M=19.49, SD=1.42), and 30.4% (N=55) identified as female while 
69.6% (N=126) identified as male. Plea rates did not differ by 
gender. Overall, 51.9% (N=94) pleaded guilty to cheating in order 
to avoid our academic review board, and 48.1% (N=87) rejected 
the plea offer. 
This first study tested the impact of the proposed punishment 
attached to a guilty finding in front of an academic review board. 
Student participants were randomly assigned to hear about a 
harsh punishment or a lenient punishment. There was no 
difference in plea choice for these students (2 <1.0). For students 
who were “guilty”, the rate of pleas when faced with a harsh 
punishment was 73.1% and 72.4% when faced with the more 
lenient punishment. This trend was the same for “innocent” 
participants: 45.9% plead guilty in the harsh conditions and 40% 
in the lenient conditions. 
As is evident from the previous paragraph, the largest 
difference in plea rates is between those who cheated and those 
who did not cheat. Similar to previous work, Study 1 showed that 
72.7% of those guilty of cheating chose to plead guilty and 42.9% 
of the innocent chose to plead guilty, 2 (1, 181)=12.51, p<.001, 
phi=.28 (continuity correction applied). Logistic regression 
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confirmed that punishment did not affect pleas (Beta=.19, p=.55) 
but guilt was a strong predictor (Beta=1.27, p<.001, Odds 
Ratio=3.57). 
Equally important, the available data shows participants’ 
willingness to implicate others. Of our 94 individuals (across 
conditions) choosing to plead guilty to the accusation, 73 agreed to 
voluntarily sign our “instigator” sheet, supposedly identifying who 
instigated the cheating. Of those actually “guilty” of cheating who 
agreed to sign the sheet (N=32), 81.3% (n=26) correctly stated the 
confederate was the instigator, while 18.8% (n=6) indicated they 
personally instigated the cheating. Of those actually “innocent”, i.e. 
those who did not cheat on the assignment given them but who 
pled guilty to doing so and agreed to sign the instigator sheet 
(N=41), 41.5% (n=17) took the blame and stated that they 
personally instigated the (nonexistent) cheating but 58.5% (n=24) 
said the confederate was the instigator.  
This means that for those falsely confessing, over half falsely 
implicated an innocent person. In other words, it was more likely 
than not that the plea bargains generated misinformation and 
implicated innocent people, when individuals were willing to 
discuss instigation. This effect of guilt condition was significant, 2 
(1, 73)=12.51, p=.04, phi=.24. 
The second study more directly tested plea bargains obtained 
through cooperation by requiring that individuals implicate their 
fellow student to receive a plea deal. Since we found no effect for 
punishment from the first study, the sanction we tied to the 
academic review board was the same for all participants in this 
study. A total of 133 students participated in Study 2; six of these 
individuals were excluded because they became upset and had to 
be debriefed prior to the dependent variable; one individual 
refused to complete the study; and eight individuals were excluded 
after displaying suspicion about the deception. As with Study 1, a 
number of individuals (N=38) who were initially assigned to our 
“cheat” condition had to be moved to the “no cheat” condition after 
failing to collaborate with our confederate. Of the remaining 118 
participants, ages ranged from 18-47 (Median=19, SD=3.55); 
38.1% (N=45) identified as female and 60.2% (N=71) identified as 
male. Plea rates did not differ by gender. 
Again, the results from the study in the United States showed 
significant rates of guilty pleas and of innocent students pleading 
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guilty. Our overall rate of guilty pleas was 67.8% (N=80) across 
conditions. For our “guilty” participants, 71.4% (N=30) chose to 
plead guilty, and for our “innocent” participants, 65.8% (N=50) 
accepted the plea deal. This means that guilt was actually not a 
significant predictor of plea acceptance—the rates were high 
across the board, regardless of guilt or innocence. Adding in the 
extra requirement of implicating a fellow student in order to 
receive a deal did not lead to fewer innocents pleading, but instead 
we saw even more accepting the deal than in Study 1. Additional 
research will need to explore why this outcome occurred, but one 
possibility is that the extra step introduced into the process made 
the ordeal seem more formal and more daunting, leading to more 
individuals to want to get the process over with as quickly as 
possible. 
Those who succumbed to our confederate’s requests to cheat 
were, overall, willing to indicate that the confederate was indeed 
the instigator only about a third of the time (33.3%, n=10). Instead, 
they indicated that they themselves were to blame in the majority 
of sessions (66.7%, n=20). All 50 of our innocent participants 
answered the instigator questions in Study 2, and 52% (n=26) 
stated that the confederate was the one who started the cheating 
—again, this is when no cheating actually occurred. The most 
concerning part was that of our 50 innocent individuals, 88% 
(n=44) were willing to testify that cheating had, in fact, occurred 
and that the confederate was involved in the event. 
Data from these experiments suggests the burden of 
contesting innocence and the risks of increased punishment 
influence behavior. Equally important, this data shows this 
influence precludes reliance on the veracity of a bargained 
statement or cooperation. It casts doubt on information provided 
about third parties in exchange for a lesser punishment. 
2. Pleading Rates in South Korea 
Our South Korean colleagues collected data from 89 students 
for Study 1 from two universities in South Korea. Out of the 89 
participants, 63 completed the study without suspicion and 
without needing to end early. Their ages ranged from 18-27 
(M=21.33, SD=2.27); 65.07% (N=41) identified as female and 
34.9% (N=22) identified as male. Plea rates did not differ by 
gender. 
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Similar to the United States results, the manipulation of 
punishment did not affect plea rates. Broken down by category, for 
those in the cheat condition faced with the harsher of the two 
proposed punishment, 68.4% pled guilty, and 31.6% chose the 
academic review board. Of those faced with the more lenient 
punishment, 62.5% pled guilty, and 37.5% chose academic review 
board. 
The South Korean sample also showed that the best predictor 
of plea rates was actual guilt. Logistic regression confirmed that 
punishment did not affect pleas (Beta=-.11, p=.90) but guilt was a 
predictor (Beta=1.39, p=.06, Odds Ratio=4.00). For those in the 
non-cheat condition, when faced with the harsher punishment, 
27.3% pled guilty and 72.7% chose the academic review board. 
When faced with the more lenient punishment, 29.4% pled guilty 
and 70.6% chose the academic review board. Collapsed across 
punishment, 65.7% of guilty participants chose to plead guilty, and 
28.5% of innocent participants chose to plead guilty. 
The data regarding the number of students who provided 
evidence regarding the “instigator” is limited, but shows 
participants willing to implicate others, albeit at a lower rate than 
found in the United States. Out of a sample size of 63, 59% (N=37) 
of the participants who accepted the plea offer provided evidence 
regarding the “instigator”. Among the participants who were 
solicited to cheat, did cheat, and then pled guilty (N=23), 39% 
(n=9) indicated that they instigated the cheating; 61% (n=14) 
indicated that the other person instigated the cheating. With the 
innocent participants, among those participants who were asked 
to cheat but refused and still pled guilty, all 9 students indicated 
the other person instigated the cheating. Among those who were 
not asked to cheat but pled guilty, 3 out of 5 falsely stated that they 
instigated the cheating while the other 2 falsely implicated the 
other student. 
Results from the study in South Korea again show large 
numbers of innocent students, roughly 30%, pleading guilty to 
cheating to avoid the burden of contesting innocence and risks of 
increased punishment. The results also show those guilty of 
cheating frequently, almost 40% of the time, giving inaccurate 
information about the role of the confederate. For the innocent 
pleading guilty, while they had a higher tendency to implicate 
508 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
themselves, still 40% of the time they falsely implicated their 
innocent colleague. 
The second study in South Korea again more directly tested 
plea bargains obtained through cooperation by requiring that 
individuals implicate their fellow student to receive a plea deal. In 
this study, 84 students participated with 78 completing the 
experiment. Ages ranged from 18-27 (M=20.78, SD=2.18); 82.1% 
(N=64) of the participants identified as female and 17.9% (N=14) 
identified as male. Plea rates did not differ by gender. 
While the need to implicate another did not greatly reduce the 
plea rates in the United States sample, it seemed to have an effect 
on the South Korean participants. The overall guilty plea rate was 
actually lower than the rate of those rejecting the plea—41% 
(N=32) compared to 59% (N=46). For those in the guilty condition, 
72.9% (N=27) pled guilty, but only 12.2% (N=5) of the innocent 
participants chose to plead to the accusation and avoid the 
Academic Review Board. The Chi-Square test indicated that this 
was significantly fewer innocents pleading guilty than expected, 2 
(1, 78)=27.24, p<.001, phi=.62 (continuity correction applied). 
For the South Korean sample, all of those individuals who 
cheated and pled guilty (N=27) correctly implicated the 
confederate as the instigator, and 88.9% (n=24) stated they would 
be willing to do so in testimony to the Academic Review Board. For 
the five innocent students who pled guilty, two stated that they 
themselves instigated the cheating while the other three 
implicated the confederate. Only two were willing to testify to the 
Academic Review Board.  
3. Pleading Rates in Japan 
Our Japanese colleagues encountered a number of difficulties 
administering the experiment, which precluded completion of 
either study.  As a result, there are no statistically valid conclusions 
to draw.  But there is data to discuss, and there are some trends to 
identify.  
In Japan, 29 students participated in Study 1, with 27 
completing the same. Of those, 29.6% (N=8) identified as female 
and 70.3% (N=19) identified as male; ages ranged from 18-27, with 
a mean of 21.76. Analysis of this limited data, including both the 
participants in the harsh and lenient portion of the study, showed 
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35.7% of the innocent participants and 61.5% of the guilty 
participants accepting the plea bargain offered. 
Broken down by category, for those in the cheat condition 
faced with the harsher of the two proposed punishment, 57.1% 
pled guilty, and 42.9% chose to appear before the academic review 
board. Of those faced with the more lenient punishment, 66.7% 
pled guilty, and 33.3% chose to appear before the academic review 
board. For those in the non-cheat condition, when faced with the 
harsher punishment, 28.6% pled guilty, and 71.4% chose the 
academic review board. When faced with the more lenient 
punishment, 42.9% pled guilty, and 57.1% chose the academic 
review board. Plea decisions did not differ by gender.  The numbers 
are limited, but, again, show significant numbers of innocent 
students, roughly thirty to forty percent (30-40%), pled guilty to 
cheating to avoid the burden of contesting innocence and risks of 
increased punishment.   
IV. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS & ONGOING INQUIRIES 
The data suggest that the innocent pleading guilty is not a 
localized concern. It happens in the United States. It happens in 
South Korea. It happens in Japan. And it happens at rates that 
should lead to a re-evaluation of the risks and benefits of plea 
bargaining, formal or informal, in each country. Plea bargaining’s 
innocence phenomenon is global. 
The research in the United States shows forty to fifty percent 
of the study population willing to falsely condemn themselves in 
return for a perceived benefit. This suggests that the US Supreme 
Court was wrong in its 1970 Brady decision to place confidence in 
the ability of individuals to assert their right to trial in the face of 
uncertainty and risk.280 The data also suggest it is wrong to place 
confidence in the information provided as a result of the plea 
bargain, including information against co-defendants provided in 
formal proceedings by those who have pleaded guilty.  
In Study One, twenty percent of the study population guilty of 
cheating gave incorrect information regarding the role of the other 
student. More striking, fifty-six percent of those pleading guilty to 
cheating who did not actually cheat falsely implicated another 
 
280. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750-51, 758 (1970). See also Bordenkircher 
v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978). 
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student. In Study 2 in the United States, almost sixty-six percent of 
the innocent participants pled guilty and fifty-two percent of them 
were willing to falsely implicate other innocent students. 
Our 2013 study provided laboratory evidence that plea 
bargaining can lead to false pleas by a significant number of 
innocent defendants. We now have laboratory evidence indicating 
that plea bargaining’s innocence problem extends beyond 
individuals offering false confessions that implicate themselves in 
return for leniency. This new data demonstrates that individuals 
are also willing to provide false testimony against others in return 
for the benefits of a bargain. If a significant number of individuals 
are willing to falsely implicate others in return for a plea bargain, 
this phenomenon might lead others to falsely plead guilty in 
response or result in a wrongful conviction at trial. In either case, 
these findings call into question the reliability of any system that 
relies on plea bargaining to adjudicate guilt. These findings also 
demonstrate, unequivocally, that the Brady compromise has failed 
and that the efficiency of plea bargaining comes at a high price with 
regard to accuracy. 
Laboratory evidence from South Korea showed the same 
concerns exist there, and a need for caution in implementing a plea 
bargaining system there. Approximately thirty percent of innocent 
study participants in Study 1 were willing to forgo a chance to 
prove their innocence and falsely condemn themselves in return 
for a perceived benefit, suggesting the pressures created by offers 
of leniency are significant. Forty percent of the innocent falsely 
implicated another in pleading guilty to something that they did 
not do, suggesting “cooperation in gathering evidence” may result 
in false evidence gathered. The Study 2 results showed far fewer 
innocent students pleading guilty when doing so required them to 
implicate another. But note what happened for those that did: the 
sample size is small, but sixty percent of these innocent students 
falsely implicated another student, and forty percent indicated a 
willingness to testify against another student. 
Finally, while the data from Japan is limited, there are trends 
that suggest concerns similar to those found in the South Korea and 
United States studies. They sound a similar warning to those 
beginning to implement plea bargaining in Japan. Absent 
significant procedural safeguards, the innocent will be implicated. 
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While this study highlights the dangers of a plea bargaining 
system, it does not suggest abolishing plea bargaining as the 
answer. Doing so in the United States is impractical as court 
systems are overburdened even with more than ninety-five 
percent of convictions resulting from pleas of guilty.  Even if we 
adequately addressed the devastating impacts of 
overcriminalization and the need for criminal justice reform in the 
United States, including de-criminalization, having no plea 
bargaining system seems untenable.281  Further, at its core, plea 
bargaining holds the potential of being beneficial to all parties and, 
therefore, eliminating plea bargaining may be as detrimental to the 
parties as to the system itself. The aspiration is not to eliminate 
plea bargaining, but to find a path forward that better protects the 
rights of those within the system, while simultaneously valuing 
accuracy more than efficiency.  
The same concerns and realities are important to the 
discussions occurring in Japan and South Korea. Institutional 
incapacity explains the current “necessity” of informal plea 
bargaining and the use of summary procedures in exchange for 
pleas in Japan and South Korea. There are simply not enough 
prosecutors, judges, and courts to try every case.  At the same time, 
the idea of “trading justice” is “appalling” to many Japanese and 
South Koreans.282 
They continue to see a fundamental conflict between plea 
bargaining and the criminal justice system’s truth-seeking 
function.283 In South Korea, as in Japan and Germany, justice is not 
a value to be “bargained.”284 “Plea bargaining is highly likely to lead 
to results that may go against the basic principles of criminal 
justice systems, which are to seek truth and reach a fair decision, 
 
281. For a discussion of the symbiotic relationship between plea bargaining and 
overcriminalization, see Lucian E. Dervan, Overcriminalization 2.0: The Symbiotic 
Relationship Between Plea Bargaining and Overcriminalization, 7 J. L., ECON. & POL’Y 645 
(2011). 
282. See David T. Johnson, Plea Bargaining in Japan, supra note 34, at 141: Park 
Interview, supra note 170. 
282. KEIJI SOSHOUHOU [C. Crim. Pro.] 2018, art. 1 (Japan). 
283. Park Interview, supra note 170. 
284. David T. Johnson, Prosecution of Corruption, supra note 45, at 62. “An emphasis 
on finding the truth is a distinctive characteristic of both civil and criminal law processes 
in civil law systems.” Haley, supra note 19, at 8. 
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by making a compromise with criminals for the benefit of 
investigative authorities and the prosecution.”285 
Second, abolishing a formal plea bargaining system does not 
end plea bargaining. It simply drives it into the shadows. Scholars 
and practitioners have long acknowledged the presence of 
informal plea bargaining in Japan and South Korea. 286  And 
widespread existence of informal plea bargaining in the United 
States was one of the reasons for the Brady compromise in 1970.287 
Plea bargaining is likely here to stay. 
The question is how best to structure this system of justice. 
Informal plea bargaining is not necessarily the answer. How often 
will the lure of quickly resolving the issue through confession and 
a summary procedure, just like quickly resolving the cheating 
allegation, result in false confession and misinformation? Are those 
risks greater in a system with a “dominant” South Korean 
prosecutor negotiating a deal in the shadows, or a Japanese 
prosecutor engaging in “subtle communication” (haragei)? 
The current studies presented here provide some clues about 
how one might instead structure or revise a formal plea bargaining 
system to provide better protection for defendants and reduce the 
likelihood of false pleas or false testimony. And they suggest that 
the limitations implemented in Japan and under consideration in 
South Korea fall short. Though limiting plea bargaining to those 
implicating another in specified crimes and requiring the consent 
of defense counsel may reduce false pleas, these steps alone are not 
enough. 
Examination of notes compiled during the debriefing of 
participants in the 2013 study in the United States shows two 
common concerns drove participants’ behavior. First, study 
participants sought to avoid the review process and move directly 
to punishment. Second, study participants sought a punishment 
that minimized risk and did not require the deprivation of future 
liberty interests.288 
 
285. Nat’l Assembly of the Republic of Korea, supra note 174, at 2-3. 
286. See supra Parts II.B.1, II.C.1. 
287. See supra Part II.A.1.  
288.  See Dervan & Edkins, supra note 6, at 37. 
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Further research is necessary to better understand these 
motivations, but one trend is clear. The accused are risk adverse 
and seek immediate resolution to the dispute. The participants’ 
actions directly mimic a phenomenon that has drawn much debate 
in the United States. The students appear to select “probation” and 
immediate release rather than risking further constraint or 
“incarceration” through forced participation in a “trial.” 289  One 
must question how different this is from current criminal 
procedure offering offenders, who are not given or cannot afford 
pretrial release, an option of time served in return for a plea of 
guilty. A recent study conducted by two of the three authors of this 
Article suggests there is little difference: in that study participants 
were almost three times more likely to falsely plead guilty when 
pretrial detention was utilized.290 
The present study also speaks to risk avoidance. Previous 
research suggested that plea bargaining’s innocence problem 
might be minimal if defendants are risk prone and willing to defend 
themselves before a tribunal. 291  Our research, however, 
demonstrates that when South Korean, Japanese, and American 
study participants are placed in real, rather than hypothetical, 
bargaining situations and informed of their probability of success, 
innocent individuals are highly risk averse. 292 
These trends highlight the need for procedural reforms in 
each country studied. Countering basic human tendencies to seek 
a quick resolution and avoid risk requires adequate information 
and space to consider alternatives. 
 
289. See Dervan & Edkins, supra note 6, at 37-38. 
290. See Vanessa A. Edkins & Lucian E. Dervan, Freedom Now or a Future Later: 
Pitting the Lasting Implications of Collateral Consequences against Pretrial Detention in 
Decisions to Plead Guilty, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 204, 205 (2018). 
291. Avishalom Tor et al., Fairness and the Willingness to Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 
7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 113 (2010) (“[I]f innocents tend to reject offers that guilty 
defendants accept, the concern over the innocence problem may be exaggerated.”); Oren 
Gazal-Ayal & Limor Riza, Plea Bargaining and Prosecution, 155 (European Ass’n of Law & 
Econ., Working Paper No. 013-2009, 2009) (“Since trials are designed to reveal the truth, 
an innocent defendant would correctly estimate that his chances at trial are better than 
the prosecutor’s offer suggests. As a result, innocent defendants tend to reject offers, while 
guilty defendants tend to accept them.”); Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1117, 1165 (2008); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 
HARV. L. REV. 2464, 2507 (2004) (“Defendants’ attitudes toward risk and loss will 
powerfully shape their willingness to roll the dice at trial.”). 
292. See Dervan & Edkins, supra note 6, at 36-37. 
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One protection that might reduce the risk of false pleas is to 
limit pre-trial detention. Such reforms can limit the sometimes-
overwhelming need to “just be done with it” even if it means 
accepting a penalty wrongly imposed. Providing meaningful 
counsel to the accused early in the process can also assist by 
providing the space and perspective to better weigh the impulse to 
“just be down with it” with the value of contesting innocence. 
Japan’s pre-trial detention procedures almost certainly 
exacerbate tendencies for the innocent to “cooperate”. Police may 
detain a suspect for forty-eight hours before referral to a 
prosecutor. If the prosecutor concurs with the police, s/he then has 
twenty-four hours to obtain a warrant of detention. The prosecutor 
may then petition the court to approve detention of the suspect for 
up to ten days, with the possibility of an additional ten-day 
detention order. As a result, a suspect may be held in custody 
before indictment for twenty-three days.293  But with sequential 
investigations and indictments twenty-three days can turn into 
months. 294  In Carlos Ghosn’s case, it turned into 139 days of 
detention. 295  During that time, for the police and prosecutors, 
obtaining a confession is one of the highest priorities.296 For the 
accused, long periods of interrogation followed by isolation in a 
police holding cell are not uncommon.297 
Those who are indicted in Japan usually remain in detention. 
There are reports suggesting that bail is denied in approximately 
seventy-five percent of the cases and, when granted, it is delayed 
 
293. Haley, supra note 19, at 9 (noting that this corresponds to the average number 
of days persons arrested in the US spent in jail awaiting trial in 2013). 
294. Professor Levin in his work discusses events where the Japanese authorities 
detained, without trial, one of the leaders of the Okinawan protests against US military 
base expansion from October 2016 to March 2017.  See Levin, supra note 17, at 183.  See 
also Lawrence Repeta, The Silencing of an anti-U.S. base protestor in Okinawa, JAPAN TIMES 
(Jan. 4, 2017). 
295. See, e.g., Nicolas Johnson, supra note 24; Wingfield-Hayes, supra note 24. 
296. Haley, supra note 19, at 9. The purpose is two-fold. “Confessions are the ‘king of 
evidence’ (shouko no ou).” Id. at 10. Japanese prosecutors see confessions as evidence of 
remorse and the first step towards reintegration into society. Id. Obtaining a confession is 
a means of correcting offender behavior without retributive or incapacitating sanctions. 
Id. Professor Johnson describes confessions as “the heart” of the Japanese criminal justice 
system. DAVID T. JOHNSON, THE JAPANESE WAY OF JUSTICE: PROSECUTING CRIME IN JAPAN 243 
(2002). 
297. For Professor Levin’s description of extended custody in isolated police holding 
cells, see Levin, supra note 17, at 175-76, 183. 
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until after the first hearing resulting in several months of detention 
before bail.298  In short, for those seeking immediate resolution, 
lengthy pre-trial detention will place inordinate, perhaps 
overwhelming pressure on the accused to “cooperate” and reach a 
plea agreement. 
Pre-trial detention practices in South Korea present similar 
risks and pressure. In South Korea, the accused may be detained 
up to forty-eight hours before being charged, and the opportunity 
for bail is “limited”299 Instead, the accused are routinely detained 
up to two months, with extensions up to six months during the 
police and prosecutor’s investigation. The result, again, is 
inordinate pressure to cooperate. Often the accused must weigh six 
months in jail and little chance of prevailing at trial, with the 
chance to “cooperate” and get on with life.300 
There are other reforms that may also reduce the likelihood 
of false pleas and false testimony in the United States, Japan, South 
Korea, and any other country relying on plea bargaining. First, the 
trial penalty, the increase in punishment a defendant receives if 
they reject a plea offer and proceed to trial, must be limited. Few 
things are more coercive than the prospect of spending month, 
years, or even decades longer in prison for exercising the right to 
trial. Second, plea bargaining must be more transparent. This 
includes providing defendants more information before deciding 
whether to plead guilty, such as exculpatory information, and 
placing information about plea offers and incentives on the record 
for review. Third, defendants must be afforded a reasonable 
amount of time to consider pleas with the assistance of counsel. 
Pleas of guilty, even in misdemeanor cases in the United States, 
carry significant collateral consequences that deserve considered 
decision-making, not rushed attempts to move forward too 
quickly. Finally, courts must carefully examine plea agreements 
 
298 . See, e.g., Hoshaku ga mitome rareru kakuritsu wa, dono kuraidesu ka, 
https://www.yokohama-roadlaw.com/qa-soudan/cat4/post_576.html 
[https://perma.cc/DB7Z-U4AB] (last visited Dec. 20, 2020). 
299. See, e.g., Sean Hayes, Korea’s Criminal Procedure Act: Pre-Trial Detention in 
Korea, KOREAN L. BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015), 
https://www.thekoreanlawblog.com/2015/02/koreas-criminal-defense-lawyer-
procedure-act-detention.html [https://perma.cc/395W-UUY7]. 
300. Id. 
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and pleas of guilty to ensure that defendants are making knowing 
and voluntary decisions. 
While a full discussion of these and other reforms is outside 
the scope of this Article, this brief discussion of some reforms is 
intended to illustrate that there are paths forward to better and 
more accurate plea bargaining systems. 301  In moving forward, 
however, it is important to note that the research described herein 
demonstrates that simply adopting a plea bargaining system 
without adequate protections for defendants or merely relying on 
requirements that defendants provide testimony against others in 
hopes that such a hurdle will prevent false pleas is insufficient to 
address the innocence phenomenon. 
From a comparative perspective, additional questions remain. 
Are there meaningful differences among the countries in terms of 
the risk that the innocent will plead guilty? At this point, it appears 
that the innocence problem transcends borders and ensnares 
approximately thirty to fifty percent of all innocent study 
participants. 
The numbers are slightly lower in Japan and South Korea, 
which average around thirty percent compared to the forty to fifty 
percent in the United States. Some of that may be attributable to 
the different roles that academic dishonesty and academic 
dishonesty proceedings have historically played in the different 
countries. One could posit that there is somewhat less of a stigma 
in Japan and South Korea to academic dishonesty than in the 
United States, and the procedures for resolving such claims are less 
established. But that could also mean that in the actual criminal 
systems in Japan and South Korea the numbers of innocent falsely 
pleading guilty might be higher. 
At the same time, differences in perceptions of academic 
dishonesty do not explain differences in the numbers of those 
“pleading guilty” to cheating and then providing false information 
regarding who instigated the wrongdoing. Again, the data is 
limited, but in the United States fifty-six percent of the innocent 
who pleaded guilty falsely implicated another student. In South 
Korea, in Study 1, that number was forty percent, declining to 
 
301. The American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Plea Bargaining Task 
Force is currently working on a report containing many additional recommendations 
regarding how best to reform the American plea bargaining system. The report is 
anticipated to be complete in 2021. 
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twelve percent in Study 2, when the subject was required to testify 
against another.  
There are different societal, cultural, and institutional factors 
that may explain the difference. Unknown differences in the 
administration of the study may also explain the difference.  
Regardless, the rates are significant. The data are cause for concern 
about the accuracy of criminal proceedings that utilize plea 
bargaining to obtain convictions or secure information against 
others.  
“It is a common saying in South Korea that a good man is one 
‘who can live without the law.’”302 After this research, one might 
question whether good men or women can live without good laws. 
Plea bargaining, whether informal or formal, is a fact of life in South 
Korea, Japan, and especially the United States. We would do well to 
recognize that basic human nature will lead the innocent to confess 
and those accused to falsely implicate others. The time has come to 
recognize these failures in our criminal legal systems and begin the 
process of building a new and better plea bargaining structure. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
302. Johngryn Mo, The Elusive Goal of the Rule of Law in South Korea, in THE RULE OF 
LAW IN KOREA XXVII (Jongryn Mo & David W. Brady eds., 2009). 
518 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
